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The Concept of "Religion" in the Supreme
Court of Israel
Aaron R. Petty*
[L]egal principles may have a strong relationship to a particular
religious heritage-a relationship which is so deep that we do not
always recognize it.t
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago, Joseph Dan reminded us that "there is no 'neutral'
linguistic expression, one which does not reflect various layers of cultural
and conceptual meanings."' Legal discourse is no exception. "The cultural
study of law shows that legal controversies and legal reasoning often
reflect underlying cultural perceptions." 2 And how law accounts for,
responds to, and is imbued with cultural phenomena is far more important
than "mere abstract intellectual exercises"' that the lack of neutral
expression may cause in other disciplines. In law, cultural conceptions and
common understandings are "embedded in passionate social disputes on
which the law of the state pronounces."' So where the language of law is
imbued with common terms and concepts, and neutrality is assumed rather
than demonstrated, "it is not . . . a harmless affair."'
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2004; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 2007; M.St.,
University of Cambridge, 2012; Ph.D. candidate, University of Leiden. This article is dedicated to the
memory of Julius 0. Isler.
t Margaret Davies, Pluralism in Law and Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 72, 80 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008).
1. Joseph Dan, Jewish Studies and European Terminology: Religion, Law and Ethics, in JEWISH
STUDIES IN A NEW EUROPE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF JEWISH STUDIES IN
COPENHAGEN 1994 UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR JEWISH STUDIES
xxiii, xxiii (Ulf Haxen et al. eds., 1998).
2. DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ, OUTLAWED PIGS: LAW, RELIGION, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 7 (2007).
3. Talal Asad, Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion, 40
HIST. RELIGIONS 205, 220 (2001).
4. Id.
5. Arie L. Molendijk, In Defence of Pragmatism, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION:
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In this Article, I suggest that "religion," both as it is commonly
understood, and as it is understood and applied by courts as a legal term of
art, refers chiefly to belief. This understanding of "religion" is incorrectly,
if tacitly, assumed to be both neutral and broadly applicable. Building on
previous work focusing on British courts, I now turn to investigating how
Israeli courts understand the concept of religion. And, as before, I focus on
cases addressing the question "who is a Jew?" as a window into how
courts understand religion and membership in a religion more generally.
"Among the Western-style modern democracies there is no other
country which experiences more intensely the problem of religion's place
in the state than Israel."' The country contains a "deeply divided society"'
and, as a result, where the state and religion meet "even simple matters
become complicated."'
One such complication is Israel's status as both a Jewish and democratic
state. "The Jewish-Israeli case-that of the Jewish people, the Jewish
national movement-Zionism-and the Jewish nation-state-Israel-is . .
. often said to be unique."o This is because "[b]eyond the ordinary tasks
of a modern secular democratic state, Israel's specific mission is to
constitute the national state of the Jews and to preserve and further Jewish
national culture."" Reconciling these dual and perhaps sometimes
incompatible roles "is an issue with which Israeli courts have been
struggling ever since the establishment of the state in 1948."l2 And within
that legal discourse "[n]o single problem . . . has received as much
attention as the definition of the word 'Jew."' 1 3
Israeli law uses the term "Jew" in relation to the jurisdiction of
rabbinical courts, the law of return, and matters of personal registration.14
In particular, while "Jew" as a legislative term of art "has been accorded a
religious definition in matters pertaining to the rabbinical courts, other
6. Aaron R. Petty, "Faith, However Defined": Reassessing JFS and the Judicial Conception of
Religion, 6 ELON L. REV. 117 (2014).
7. Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185, 185 (1987).
8. Gila Stopler, Religious Establishment, Pluralism and Equality in Israel-Can the Circle be
Squared?, 2 OXFORD J.L. & REL. 150, 150 (2012).
9. Amnon Rubenstein, State and Religion in Israel, 2 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 107, 107 (1967).
10. Alexander Yakobson, Jewish People and the Jewish State, How Unique?-A Comparative
Survey, 13 ISRAEL STUD. 1, 1 (2008).
I1. Englard, supra note 7, at 187.
12. Daniel B. Sinclair, Introduction, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL
POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 1, I (Daniel B. Sinclair ed., 2000).
13. Id.; see also S. ZALMAN ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA: JEWISH RELIGION IN THE JEWISH
STATE 270 (1976) ("Of the many controversies periodically agitating public opinion in Israel, none is
more acute and more fraught with emotion than the legal, religious, and historical definition of a Jew.
No other issue has engendered so much dissention and public debate as this one."); Amy-Jill Levine,
Reflections on Reflections: Jesus, Judaism and Jewish-Christian Relations, 8 STUD. JEWISH-
CHRISTIAN REL. 1, 9 (2013) ("The question 'who is a Jew' was a problem in antiquity, and it remains
a problem today.").
14. Menashe Shava, Comments on the Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970 (Who Is a
Jew?), 3 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 140, 141 (1977).
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definitions have been applied to the same term in other contexts." 5
As Judaism is the dominant religion in Israel, how Israeli courts
understand "who is a Jew" in a legal context says a great deal about how
those courts understand religion more generally. This legal understanding
reveals factors that the courts would likely find relevant in deciding what
makes a religion a religion. Accordingly, I am not particularly concerned
with the answer to the question "who is a Jew"-if there is one (or even if
there are many).16 Instead, I am interested in how the question has been
answered by courts of law and what the shape of the legal discourse has
been in responding to that question; I am interested in what assumptions
have been made, and in what factors have been determinative.
To set the legal issues in context, in Part II, I briefly trace the emergence
of the State of Israel. Part II.A discusses the early Zionist movement with
particular attention to the philosophy of Theodor Herzl. Part II.B traces the
early legal foundations of the State of Israel from the Balfour Declaration
through the Proclamation of the State. Part III concerns the legal system
created by the State. Part III.A introduces the legal structure of the state of
Israel. Part III.B details the function and authority of the courts within that
structure. Part III.C addresses the legal status of religion in the state, and
Part III.D looks at the Law of Return, a unique feature of Israeli law
applicable only to Jews (and certain relations). Part IV concerns the
substantive debate on "Who is a Jew" under Israeli civil law. Part IV.A
discusses in detail three seminal cases addressing the legal relationship
between Judaism and the State-Rufeisen (also known as Brother Daniel),
Shalit, and Beresford-along with significant legislation passed in the
wake of Shalit. Part IV.B attempts to reconcile these decisions and tease
out the factors that the Israeli Supreme Court has considered significant
and the assumptions that it has made in adjudicating issues of religious
identity.
Part V turns to the historical validity and neutrality of the understanding
of "religion" applied by the Israeli Supreme Court. Part V.A offers an
overview of the Christian origins of the modern concept of "religion" as
primarily a matter of belief. Part V.B reflects on how the Jewish state,
through its secularist Supreme Court, could have come to a Christian
understanding of religion. Finally, Part VI takes a step back to place the
findings in the wider debate on secularization. Part VI.A provides the
15. Id.; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 270 ("[I]n Israel the problem has been focused ...
on the legal definition of who a Jew is.").
16. As Gad Barzilai has persuasively argued, the question of "Who is a Jew" is "not a static
question or a fixed dilemma but rather a dynamic construction of political interests amid struggles of
communities over political power. Thus the issue of 'who is a Jew' is not an autonomous problem
waiting to be politically and legally resolved but rather a social language that serves the political
purposes of social engineering." Gad Barzilai, Who is a Jew? Categories, Boundaries, Communities
and Citizenship Law in Israel, in BOUNDARIES OF JEWISH IDENTITY 27, 28 (Susan Anita Glenn &
Naomi B. Sokoloffeds., 2010).
Petty 213
3
Petty: The Concept of "Religion" in the Supreme Court of Israel
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
necessary background on this secularization paradigm, and Part VI.B
suggests that these cases may point to a useful refinement. Part VII offers
a brief conclusion.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
The modem state of Israel claims an ancient pedigree. In 586 B.C.
Babylonians captured the land of Israel and forced a significant portion of
the population to relocate to Babylon." After the return from exile the
Israelite population flourished for several centuries, but the conversion of
Constantine to Christianity in the fourth century signaled a period of
decline in both population and status of Jews.' 8 Over the ensuing
centuries, "Jews became united ... by a sense of unique isolation,
periodically accentuated by outbursts of active anti-semitism."" And it
was in this context of "shared persecution, made more bitter by frustrated
attempts at assimilation, that Zionism grew." 20 The discussion of "Who is
a Jew?" in the Supreme Court of Israel "takes place within the Zionist
narrative of history."21
A. The Zionist Movement
"The Zionist movement arose in the context of nineteenth-century
European nationalism and defined itself in opposition to the idea that Jews
could be full members of a modem nation-state, whether French, German,
or Russian, while adhering to their Jewish religion in their private lives."2 2
Instead, Zionism claimed that Jews constituted a nation themselves,23 and
aimed to create a state for that nation.24 Over time, three main strands of
Zionist thought emerged: religious, socialist, and "Zionism as refuge." 25
What united all Zionists, however, was their agreement "on the need to
17. S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and Spiritual
Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 118 (1997).
18. Id. at 119.
19. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 107.
20. Id. See also MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 14 (2011) (noting that
Zionism was a response to both "the distressing conditions of Jewish existence in Eastern and central
Europe" and "an answer to the grave cultural crisis that Jews faced in the nineteenth century."). On the
historical development of secular Judaism generally, of which Zionism is part, see ABRAMOV, supra
note 13, at 272-73.
21. Daphne Barak-Erez, Collective Memory and Judicial Legitimacy: The Historical Narrative of
the Israeli Supreme Court, 16 CANADIAN J.L. & SOC'Y. 93, 109 (2001).
22. LEORA BATNITZKY, How JUDAISM BECAME A RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
JEWISH THOUGHT 147 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and Jewish Identity, 4
JEWISH Soc. STUD., NEW SERIES 112, 112 (1998).
25. Lucy Endel Bassli, The Future of Combining Synagogue and State in Israel: What Have We
Learned in the First Fifty Years?, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 477, 480 (2000).
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recreate a Jewish State-that is what made them Zionists."26
Religious Zionists rejected the Orthodox Jewish religious tenet that the
Jews will return to the land of Israel en masse only when the Messiah
comes, and instead focused on the biblical promise of the land of Israel to
the people of Israel. 27 Socialist Zionism, by contrast, "rejected any
association with traditional Judaism, including such basic tenets . . . as
observance of the Sabbath and dietary laws." 28 But "[t]he mainstream of
Zionism," which ultimately led to the creation of the state, "tried to
introduce an element of normalcy into an abnormal situation." 29 That is, it
viewed Zionism as the preferable response to "the Jewish question" in
Europe.30
In the late nineteenth century, "[fjaced with the rise of anti-Semitism
throughout Europe, Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, was revived by
Theodor Herzl, an educated Western European Jewish journalist and
author." Herzl was born in 1860 in Budapest to an assimilated Jewish
family.32 He studied law in Vienna and, as a young man, left an
unpromising career as a playwright to take up journalism. 3  In 1892 he
became the Paris correspondent for Vienna's New Free Press, and in this
capacity two years later he reported on the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus.
Following Germany's 1871 annexation of Alsace-Lorraine under the
terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt, French support for Russia increased
steadily. 34 In this context, French Jews who were not favorably disposed
toward Russia (as many were not, on account of anti-Jewish pogroms)
26. Martin Edelman, A Portion of Animosity: The Politics of Disestablishment of Religion in
Israel, 5 ISRAEL STUD. 204, 205 (2000).
27. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 147.
28. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 37.
29. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 107. See also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 56 ("Zionism claims
to seek the normalization of the Jewish people.").
30. Bassli, supra note 25, at 481. "The Jewish Question" broadly concerns the debate in Europe at
the end of the nineteenth century concerning the appropriate treatment and status of Jews in society,
with particular reference to political rights, and the extent to which Jewish identity (especially Jewish
national identity) did or should prevent or limit integration and political participation in European
states. The phrase appears to have entered broad usage following Bruno Bauer's 1843 work Die
Judenfrage (The Jewish Question), and Karl Marx's 1844 response Zur Judenfrage (On the Jewish
Question). The phrase, however, appeared much earlier in both English and French (la questionjuive),
and at least the idea of Jewish emancipation had entered discussion in Germany close to a century
earlier. See Gad Freudenthal, Aaron Salomon Gumpertz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, and the First Call
for an Improvement of the Civil Rights of Jews in Germany (1753), 29 AJS REv. 299 (2005). Even
ancient origins have been suggested. Avi AVIDOV, NOT RECKONED AMONG NATIONS: THE ORIGINS
OF THE SO-CALLED "JEWISH QUESTION" IN ROMAN ANTIQUITY (2009).
31. Id. at 479. Although Herzl's contribution was undoubtedly more significant to the creation of
the State of Israel, he was not the first to call for the establishment of a state. In 1882 Leo Pinsker
published a pamphlet entitled Auto-Emancipation, which advocated for the creation of a Jewish state.
See ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 44.
32. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60; BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152.
33. Id.
34. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152.
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were seen as pro-German and, therefore, anti-French.3 1 Coupled with a
simultaneous rise in French nationalism, the perceived anti-French attitude
of French Jews heightened an atmosphere of antisemitism that culminated
in the trial of Dreyfus.36
Dreyfus, like Herzl, was an assimilated Jew.37 He hailed from Alsace (a
German-speaking region) and was a career officer in the French Army.38
Accused of treason for allegedly communicating French military secrets to
the German embassy in Paris, Dreyfus was subjected to a trial closed to
both the public and journalists. 3 9 Despite his claims of innocence and the
lack of any reliable evidence against him, Dreyfus was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. 40 After the verdict was announced, "mobs
crowded the streets of Paris for days, shouting 'Death to the Jews."' 4 1
The turning point in Herzl's life was his coverage, as a journalist, of the
Dreyfus affair and "its attendant outbursts of antisemitism." 42 He later
claimed, "The Dreyfus trial ... which I witnessed in Paris in 1894, made
me a Zionist." 43 He claimed that this injustice, and the public sentiment
that followed, demonstrated the ultimate futility of Jewish assimilation in
Europe. If the most enlightened of European countries-in his words,
"republican, modern, civilized France one hundred years after the
declaration of the Rights of Man"-could not tolerate even the most






40. Id. Dreyfus spent almost five years as a prisoner on Devil's Island in French Guiana. In 1896,
Colonel Georges Picquart, the head of counterespionage in the French Army, identified Major
Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy as the real spy. For this discovery, Picquart was transferred to Tunis.
Esterhazy was tried, but acquitted, and some historians theorize that Esterhazy was, in fact, a double
agent. After Esterhazy's acquittal, both Dreyfus and Picquart faced charges related to the documents
implicating Esterhazy.
In January 1898, Emile Zola published Jaccuse, an open letter claiming that Dreyfus was framed.
Leading intellectuals began to call for the case to be reopened. Dreyfus was returned to France in
1899, re-tried, and again convicted. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment but pardoned and set
free shortly after the trial. It was not until 1906 that Dreyfus was fully exonerated. He was reinstated
as a Major in the French Army, served during World War 1, and retired as a Lieutenant Colonel.
Picquart, who had left the Army, was reinstated and promoted to Brigadier General and later served in
the Clemenceau cabinet as Minister of War.
There is a wealth of literature on the Dreyftus affair. For the broad outlines, see, for example, LOUiS
BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (2009); MICHAEL BURNS, FRANCE AND THE DREYFUS
AFFAIR: A BRIEF DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1999); PIERS PAUL READ, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR (2012).
41. BATNITSKY,supra note 22, at 152.
42. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
43. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 152 (quoting THEODOR HERZL, ZIONIST WRITINGS: ESSAYS
AND ADDRESSES 2:112 (Harry Zohn trans., 1973). Batnitzky notes that some recent scholarship has
cast doubt on Herzl's claim about the centrality of the Dreyfus affair to the development of his own
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no hope for assimilation of any Jews anywhere in Europe. 4 An alternative
was required. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, Herzl wrote his
seminal essay, Der Judenstaat, in which he proposed "the Jews 'be
granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the
rightful requirements of a nation."' 4 5 This 1896 publication "brought the
concept of creating a Jewish homeland to the attention of international
leaders and politicians."46
Herzl prioritized the physical survival and political emancipation of
individuals over the survival of Jewish religion or culture.47 Indeed, in Der
Judenstaat, Herzl "depicted the future state in terms of the European
atmosphere which he knew among the liberal assimilated Jews of Central
Europe." 48 Even the title of his work, although often translated into
English as "The Jewish State" means something closer to "the Jews'
state." 49 In other words, for Herzl, "the state is for the sake of the survival
of Jews, and not for the sake of the survival of Judaism or some form of
Jewishness."o And as in other European states, religion, as he understood
it, was to be subordinated to the state:
Are we eventually going to set up a theocracy? No! Belief holds us
together, science makes us free. We are not going to allow our
rabbis even to think about theocratic ideas. We are going to know
how to restrict them to their synagogues just as we are going to
retain our army within their bases. Army and rabbinate shall be
honoured deeply as is becoming to their high function and merits.
They have no word to say in the affairs of the State which has thus
honoured them because they would bring about internal and
external complications."
This subordination of religious authority to the state was "the very
foundation" of the secular Zionist movement.52 But if Judaism could
acquire a secular meaning, then who was a Jew? And could, for instance, a
Jew who converted to another religion still be a Jew and a member of the
Zionist movement? 53 The following year, Herzl participated in convening
the World Zionist Congress, held in Basel on August 29, 1897. The
44. Cf MAUTNER, supra note 20, at 14 (noting that Zionism was precipitated by "the rejection of
the Jews' attempt to be accepted as equals by the non-Jewish societies in which they lived.").
45. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60; see also Bassli, supra note 25, at 479 n.9.
46. Bassli, supra note 25, at 480.
47. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 154.
48. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
49. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 154; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60 ("This was nationalism
pure and simple, in itself devoid of any religious content.").
50. Id.; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 60.
51. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108.
52. Id. See also Englard, supra note 7, at 187 ("The mainstream of modem political Zionism,
which led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, was ... guided by this idea of a national
secular Jewish state.").
53. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 108. Herzl's response to the latter question was "no." Id. at 109.
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Congress, in turn, created a permanent Zionist Organization (now known
as the World Zionist Organization) through which it could work to
implement its policy decisions.54
B. Early Legal Foundations
1. The Balfour Declaration
The work of the Zionist Organization eventually resulted in the support
of the British government. On November 2, 1917, British Foreign
Secretary Arthur Balfour, in a letter to Lord Rothschild, President of the
British Zionist Federation, called for the establishment of a national
Jewish homeland." Balfour's letter, which later became known as the
Balfour Declaration, was preceded by significant pressure from Zionist
groups,"o but was also intended to raise Jewish support and capital for the
British war effort, to ensure British control over strategically-important
Palestine if the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the wake of the war,57 and to
garner support from both the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although the Declaration was in some ways cautious, preferring the term
"national home" to "Jewish state" and avoiding mention of specific
geographical boundaries, it was nevertheless a significant victory for the
Zionist movement.59
2. The League ofNations Mandate
As the British government had anticipated, the Ottoman Empire did
collapse after the war, and in 1922 the nascent League of Nations granted
the United Kingdom a Mandate for Palestine, legitimizing British rule in
the Levant.60  The text of the Mandate incorporated the Balfour
Declaration.6 1  The Mandate continued the policy set out in the
Declaration, but stopped short of preparing the way for an independent
Jewish state. 62 Jewish immigration to Israel during the Mandate period,
54. Bassli, supra note 25, at 480.
55. Id. The Declaration noted that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object. . . ." ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 85.
56. Nancy Caren Richmond, Israel's Law of Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and Present
Application, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 n.7 (1993); ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 84 (noting the
Declaration was the result of "[a] series of well-coordinated diplomatic moves on the part of Zionist
leaders in London, Paris, Rome, and Washington").
57. Bassli, supra note 25, at 483.
58. JAMEs GELVIN, THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT: 100 YEARS OF WAR 82-83 (2005).
59. Bassli, supra note 25, at 482.
60. Id. at 483. The Mandate was assigned to the United Kingdom in 1920, the terms were
approved by the League of Nations in 1922, and it came into effect in 1923.
61. Richmond, supra note 56, at 96 n.8.
62. Bassli, supra note 25, at 483.
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until 1937, was based on the ability of the territory to economically absorb
Jewish immigrants without significantly shifting the social make-up of the
territory between Jews and Arabs.63
3. The MacDonald White Paper
At the same time that the British government had been negotiating with
Zionists regarding the establishment of a Jewish homeland, it had also
promised to Arab leaders an independent Arab state in the same territory
in exchange for support against the Ottomans. By the late 1930s, though,
Hitler's Nuremburg Laws had triggered mass Jewish exodus from
Germany and the influx of Jewish refugees had spawned Arab revolts in
Mandatory Palestine. By 1939, the British government believed that
Jewish support was either guaranteed or unnecessary, while losing the
support of the Arab world would be disastrous."
Thus, that year Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald issued a White
Paper declaring that the resettlement of 450,000 Jews had fulfilled the
Balfour Declaration's promise of a homeland for the Jewish people, and
called for the creation of a state to be governed by Jews and Arabs jointly,
providing that it should not be a "Jewish State," that further Jewish
immigration would be restricted, and that the transfer of land from Arabs
to Jews also be restricted.65 Lloyd George called the White Paper an act of
perfidy and Winston Churchill voted against the Paper and the government
in which he was a minister. Even the League of Nations' own Permanent
Mandates Commission abstained from endorsing the White Paper, and
several of its members thought MacDonald's views inconsistent with the
Mandate. 66 The British government's new policy led to significant illegal
immigration by European Jews and eventually a naval blockade. The
significance of the situation was highlighted by James Rothschild MP,
who said, "[fjor the majority of Jews who go to Palestine it is a question of
migration or of physical extinction. "67 And so it was until the end of the
Second World War.
For many, "Zionism alone emerged as a viable Jewish response" to the
Holocaust. 68 The near-total annihilation of European Jewry seemed to
confirm Herzl's doubts about the possibility of assimilation.69 It also
63. RUTH GAVISON, THE LAW OF RETURN AT SIxTY YEARS: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, JUSTIFICATION
21 (2010).
64. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 716 (1961).
65. Bassli, supra note 25, at 483. See also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 21 (noting that the British
government established stricter limits on Jewish immigration to Mandatory Palestine after the 1936-39
Arab uprisings).
66. HILBERG, supra note 64, at 717 n.7.
67. 347 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) (1939) 1984 (U.K.).
68. Richmond, supra note 56, at 95 (internal quotation omitted).
69. BATNITZKY, supra note 22, at 94 ("For Fackenheim, the Holocaust discredits the false
promises of secular modernity, including the notion that Jews can be integrated as full citizens in a
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"demand[ed] that secular and religious Jews unite in resisting any future
threat to the existence of the Jewish people."70 Zionism promised safety
and security for Jews that the countries of Europe had failed to provide. As
the Jewish Agency put it:
When we say "Jewish independence" of a "Jewish state" we mean
Jewish country, Jewish soil; we mean Jewish labour, we mean
Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture, Jewish industry, Jewish sea.
We mean Jewish language, schools, culture. We mean Jewish
safety, security, independence, complete independence, as for any
other free people. '
4. The Proclamation of the State ofIsrael
On November 27, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of an independent
Jewish state in Palestine, but the British Mandate remained in place until
midnight on May 15, 1948.72 "The establishment of Israel was the
successful culmination of the Zionist movement" that Herzl had revived
just fifty years earlier.73 And "when David Ben-Gurion read the Israeli
Proclamation of Independence in Tel-Aviv" the preceding afternoon,
"everyone understood that the Zionists were establishing the first Jewish
State in Palestine in two thousand years, but no one-not even the
founders themselves-could indicate with certainty what was meant by
the words 'Jewish State."' 74 The Proclamation did provide, however, that
"Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and the Ingathering of the
Exiles." 75 And, almost immediately, aliyah from numerous overseas
communities began.76 "In the state's first years . . . tens of thousands made
Aliyah from every comer of the world."77
For many Israelis, the Proclamation "appears to embrace the Herzlian
vision of a secular democratic state, thus representing the fulfillment of the
Zionist dream. But the one lesson to be gleaned from any comprehensive
history of the Jewish people is that there are several competing Zionist
modem nation-state.").
70. Id.
71. Bassli, supra note 25, at 485 (quoting THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, THE JEWISH
CASE 66 (1947)).
72. Richmond, supra note 56, at 95 n.3; Strong, supra note 17, at 119-20 & n.54; G.A. Res. 181
(II) at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 29, 1947).
73. Edelman, supra note 26, at 204-05.
74. Id. at 205.
75. Proclamation of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3 (1948).
76. GAVISON, supra note 63, at I1.
77. Id. For example, "nearly the entire Jewish community of Bulgaria moved to Israel, as did the
old established communities of Yemen, Iraq, and Libya, and the vast majority of those who had
survived in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Tens of thousands came from Morocco,
Tunis, Turkey, Persia, and India." ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 147.
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visions: the Zionist dream does not exist."18 The most that can be said is
that the Proclamation embodies a commitment to individual rights, as well
as a vision of the Jewish people collectively as a nation. 79 "[T]he rights of
individuals are in important and perhaps contradictory ways bound up
with the organic nature of the community and its constituent parts."so The
tension inherent in Israel's dual status as a "Jewish and democratic" state,
concerned with both individuals and the Jewish people as a whole, has
never been resolved.8'
III. THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM
One place this tension manifests is in the preferential treatment
accorded to Jewish immigrants under the Law of Return. "The Law of
Return serves as a focus for controversy, both with respect to the
justification for the preference given to Jews in Israeli immigration
policy,8 2 and with respect to the internal Jewish question regarding the
essence of the Jewish collective and the standards for identifying its
members or becoming one."83
A. The Constitutional Structure
Any discussion of Israeli law must begin with the most distinctive
feature of its legal system: the lack of a formal constitution." Although the
Proclamation promised a constitution, the Knesset was never able to pass
one. Instead, a number of Basic Laws have been passed, which have a
quasi-constitutional status.85 For many years, it was thought that Basic
Laws were not inherently superior to ordinary legislation because absent
an "entrenchment provision" requiring some specified supermajority to
modify or repeal a Basic Law, they could be modified or repealed at the
pleasure of the Knesset.86 But at the same time, Basic Laws were thought
78. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSON, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES 7 (1993).
79. Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Book Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1545, 1546 (1993).
80. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 8.
81. Edelman, supra note 26, at 218 ("Israel has never resolved the relationship between Judaism
(the religion of the Jews) and Jewish national identity."); Barzilai, supra note 16, at 29 ("Zionism, as
an aggregate of various Jewish national aspirations, has not clearly differentiated Jewish ethnicity
from religious or from nationality. Consequently, public contentions over the issue 'who is a Jew'
have been paramount for allocations of citizenship rights in Israel since the formal inception of the
state in 1948."); JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 8 ("the achievement of liberal goals pertaining to
individual rights will have to accommodate communitarian goals with which they will often be in
conflict.").
82. See, e.g., Stopler, supra note 8; GAVISON, supra note 63, at 37-59.
83. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 11.
84. Englard, supra note 7, at 190; Strong, supra note 17, at 135.
85. Strong, supra note 17, at 135. The Proclamation is also legally binding, but only to the extent
that it "expresses the vision of the people and its faith." Id at 136.
86. Id. at 135.
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"fundamental in some ill-defined sense."87
B. The Role of the Courts
Although the Israeli Supreme Court has been functioning since shortly
after the foundation of the state, its role was codified in a Basic Law only
in 1984. The Israeli Supreme Court serves two functions. It is an appellate
court of last resort, and also a court of first instance for claims against the
state in matters not under the jurisdiction of any other tribunal." "Any
person who has reason to believe that a particular state action denies her
legal rights may petition the court and ask it to issue an order nisi," which
the court will "consider rapidly and inexpensively."" A single judge
reviews the petition, and may direct the respondent to show cause why the
relief requested should not be granted." After a hearing, the court may
grant permanent injunctive relief.91
For many years, the absence of a written constitution led the Supreme
Court to "develop a position of judicial restraint[,] . . . preferring to leave
many fundamental questions to the legislature." 92 And despite its initially
limited authority to review legislation passed by the Knesset, the Supreme
Court was able to "ensure that public officials and agents of the state [did]
not abuse their powers of discretion"93 because "a high percentage of laws
in Israel consists not of primary legislation but of secondary legislation
passed by administrative bodies to implement primary enactments." 94 (In
1995 the Supreme Court "took the revolutionary step of declaring that
Israel no longer lacked a written constitution" and that "[h]enceforth ...
the Eleven Basic Laws that had been periodically enacted by the Knesset
would function as the nation's constitution," 5 but this development
postdates the decisions under consideration here.)
C. The Legal Status ofReligion
Israel is not a theocracy, nor is there even any established religion.96
87. Id at 113 n.10 (quoting MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 30
(1994)).
88. Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel's
High Court ofJustice, 24 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 781, 784 (1990); Strong, supra note 17, at 137.
89. Shamir, supra note 88, at 784.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1548.
93. Shamir, supra note 88, at 784.
94. Strong, supra note 17, at 138.
95. Edelman, supra note 26, at 209 (citing CA 6821/93 United Bank Mizrahi v. Migdal Coop.
Vill. 49(4) PD221 [1995]. Having declared the existence of a constitution, the Supreme Court took it
upon itself to review Knesset legislation for conformity with the constitution, arrogating to itself an
American style ofjudicial review.
96. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206; Natan Lerner, Religious Liberty in the State of Israel, 21
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 239, 246 (2007). Alternatively, it has been suggested that "Israel does not have
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Nominally, at least, Israel "is a secular state."97 However, Israel does not
maintain the separation between religion and the state that characterizes,
for example, the French and American legal regimes." Much of "Israeli
law rests on the foundations of the legal system instituted during the
British rule in Palestine between 1917 and 1948,"9 which itself preserved
a vestige of Ottoman rule-the millet system-under which "[t]he courts
of each [religious] community have exclusive jurisdiction over specific
matters of personal status, particularly marriage and divorce."'" This
remnant of religious authority in personal matters means that the state
"does more than simply recognize the existence of certain religions."'ol
Indeed, the government "maintains formal links with the institutional
organs of 14 religious denominations, and legally subjects individuals to
religious rules by vesting the religious courts of those religions with the
authority to resolve certain matters."l02 And because the vast majority of
residents of Israel are Jewish, "Orthodox Judaism has functioned in the
Israeli polity as if it were the official state religion," notwithstanding the
modern, Western, secular outlook that dominated Israeli culture in the
early twentieth century.'0 3
Given this delegation and decentralization, "[t]he provisions of law
relating to religion in Israel are not governed by any general scheme.
History, political expediency, party politics and, even more, chance are
responsible for an amorphous body of laws which baffles outsiders as well
as some Israelis."'" The state itself has even referred to its own
relationship with religious bodies as "labyrinthine" and conceded that it
consists of "a patchwork of laws and practices that are not easily
susceptible to generalization."' 0 One area in which this confusion is
manifest is the Law of Return, which permits Jews and certain non-Jewish
relatives of Jews to immigrate to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship.
an established religion; it has a multiple establishment." Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
97. Lerner, supra note 96, at 244 (quoting HAIM COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW 17
(1984)); BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 4 ("In principle, Israeli law is a secular system with few
exceptions.").
98. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 23.
99. Id. at 246.
100. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206. See also BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 4 ("In matters of
marriage and divorce [Israeli law] makes the law of the various religious communities binding on their
individual members, thereby preserving the approach of the British Mandate's legislation."). Article 9
of the Mandate for Palestine "scrupulously preserved . .. the personal law and the system of religious
community courts" by providing that "respect for personal status of the various peoples and
communities and for their religious interests shall be guaranteed." ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 93,
175.
101. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
102. Id. This model of interaction between the state and religion has been characterized as "state-
organized pluralism." See Paul Cliteur, State and Religion Against the Backdrop of Religious
Radicalism, 10 INT'L J. CONST. L. 127, 132 (2012).
103. Edelman, supra note 26, at 206.
104. Amnon Rubenstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 380, 380 (1967).
105. Lerner, supra note 96, at 239 (internal quotation omitted).
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D. The Law of Return
"Jewish aliyah and kibbutz galuyot ('the ingathering of the exiles') are
two of the primary goals of the Zionist enterprise and of the State of
Israel."O6 Like the Zionist project itself, "[a]liyah and the struggle for
aliyah began years before the foundation of the state."o 7 Indeed,
"[d]eliberations on the subject of Aliyah have accompanied the Zionist
enterprise from the beginning."' 0 8
But it was not until two years after the Proclamation that Ben-Gurion
fulfilled its promise that "Israel will be open for Jewish immigration."' 0 9
Speaking before the Knesset on July 3, 1950, Ben-Gurion affirmed that
Israel is a "state for all Jews wherever they may be" and emphasized that
Israel's "gates are open to every Jew.""o He explained that the Law of
Return, which was then being debated, embodies the raison d'itre of the
state.' Two days after Ben-Gurion's address, on Herzl's memorial day,
the Knesset enacted the Law of Return by unanimous vote.11 2
As Ben-Gurion explained in his address to the Knesset, the Law of
Return "is regarded as one of the pillars of the (unwritten) Israel
constitution, in the sense that it gives effect to one of the basic purposes of
the very establishment of the state."' 13 That is, it "was enacted in order to
secure a safe place for all Jews in their own homeland after the
Holocaust."" 4 But more than simply providing refuge for Jews, wherever
they may be, "[t]he Law of Return is one of the main legal instruments
designed to make Israel the state of the Jews."" 5 In this respect, the Law
106. GAVISON, supra note 63, at I1.
107. Id
108. Id at 20.
109. See supra note 75.
110. Tiffany Pransky, Boundaries of Belonging: Conversion in Israel's Law of Return 5 (2012)
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, Central European University),
http://www.etd.ceu.hul2012/pransky tiffany.pdf. Last accessed May 1, 2014.
111. Id. See also GUY BEN-PORAT & BRYAN S. TURNER, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ISRAELI
CITIZENSHIP II (2011).
112. Pransky, supra note I10, at 5; GAVISON, supra note 63, at 24.
113. Bernard S. Jackson, Brother Daniel: The Construction of Jewish Identity in the Israel
Supreme Court, 6 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS LAW 115, 123-24 (1993).
114. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 83; see also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 17 ("The 1950 Law
of Return was the political, symbolic and legal instrument with which the state fulfilled its
obligation.").
I 15. Nahshon Perez, Israel's Law ofReturn: A Qualified Justification, 31 MODERN JUDAISM 59,
60 (2011). See also id. ("The Law of Return aims to enable the immigration of all Jews to Israel,
regardless of. . .any other characteristic."); Claude Klein, The Right of Return in Israeli Law, 13 TEL
AVIv U. STUD. Law 53, 56 (1997) ("The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and,
therefore, its gates are completely open to Jewish immigration."); Shalev Ginossar, Who is a Jew: A
Better Law?, 5 ISRAEL L. REV. 264, 265 (1970) ("As everyone knows, the main concern of the State of
Israel is to keep its gates wide open for every prospective oleh, i.e. for every Jew returning to settle in
the land of his forefathers."); Yfaat Weiss, The Golem and Its Creator, or How the Jewish Nation-
State -Became Multiethnic, in CHALLENGING ETHNIC CITIZENSHIP: GERMAN AND ISRAELI
PERSPECTIVES 82, 82 (Daniel Levy & Yfaat Weiss eds., 2002) (noting the Law of Return and the
Citizenship Law are "a fundamental expression of the fact that Israel was created as the Jewish state");
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of Return enabled the State to provide an answer to the "Jewish question,"
not just in Europe (to the extent that the Holocaust had not already
rendered it moot) but everywhere. Accordingly, The Law of Return "is
perceived by many as one of the major expressions of the state's
Jewishness."' "
"Section I of the Law of Return provides that every Jew has the right to
immigration to Israel.""' "In practice, in order to realize his or her right of
return, an entitled individual must obtain a special visa known as an oleh's
visa."" 8 Under Sec. 2(b), an oleh's visa "shall be granted" to every Jew
who has expressed his desire to settle in Israel (provided the applicant
does not fall within one of three little-used exceptions on which a visa
may be denied for reasons of public health or security)."l 9 Thus,
[i]n principle, where an applicant is a Jew and where he or she
does not fit into one of the three categories enumerated in section
2(b), the Minister of the Interior has no discretionary power. An
oleh's visa must be granted to the individual, since the right of
return is an inherent right for every Jew.' 20
The Law of Return itself does not deal with the granting of citizenship,
but rather only with aliyah."l2' But the Citizenship Law provides that
"[e]very oleh by virtue of the 1950 Law of Return will be a Israeli
citizen."' 2 2  This has been interpreted to mean automatically and
immediately.123 Other avenues to citizenship exist, and include citizenship
by residence (the primary path to Israeli citizenship for Arabs who had
been citizens of Mandatory Palestine), birth, and naturalization (other than
under the Law of Return).124 But the essentially unlimited right of every
Jew to immigrate to Israel and the availability of immediate and automatic
Israeli citizenship for every oleh means that "for purposes of the Law of
Barzilai, supra note 16, at 29 (noting the Law of Return and Citizenship Law "were more important in
Israel than any other piece of legislation, including the Basic Laws, since they were supposed to
entrench Jewishness as the main political force in state ideology, legal ideology, and public policy").
116. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 11. But see Sinclair, supra note 12, at 2 ("[T]he actual legal
issues involved, i.e. automatic citizenship and registration, are not of any great practical significance.
In this respect, this area is a relatively 'safe' one for the conduct of high-level legal debate as to the
State of Israel's Jewish character.").
117. Shava, supra note 14, at 141.
118. Klein, supra note 115, at 56. This was perhaps not always so. Slovenko suggests that, at one
point, a Jew could immigrate "without passport or number." Ralph Slovenko, Brother Daniel and
Jewish Identity, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 3 (1964).
119. Klein, supra note 115, at 56.
120. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
121. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 30.
122. Id.
123. Id. See also Perez, supra note 115, at 60 ("Immigrants entering Israel under the Law of
Return are eligible immediately for full citizenship.").
124. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 30-31. Both Jews and non-Jews may be naturalized outside of
the process used for the Law of Return, but it does require a longer period of residence and a favorable
exercise of discretion by the Minister of the Interior. Id. at 31; Slovenko, supra note 118, at 3-4.
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Return the answer to the question 'Who is a Jew?' is of great
importance."1
25
"In the period before the founding of the State and in the first years
following it, the authorities did not define the term 'Jewish' but rather
made do with a declaration from the aliyah applicant that he or she was
Jewish." 26 The assumption was that few people would identify as Jews,
much less immigrate to a besieged and struggling state, if they were not
actually Jewish.127 As Ruth Gavison writes, "[w]hen the Law of Return
was formulated, shortly after the fall of Hitler, it was hardly thought,
especially by those who shared Heinrich Heine's belief that 'Judaism is
not a religion but a misfortune,' that there would be people claiming to be
Jews."' 28 Ben-Gurion himself explained:
I was in the Jewish Agency for fifteen years and I do not recall that
anyone raised this question. I was in the Jewish Agency for
thirteen years together with Rabbi Maimon and Mr. Moshe
Shapira. When a Jew arrived, I never once heard either of them
asking who his mother and father were. Nobody asked this. If a
Jew came and said he was a Jew-that was sufficient.129
During the discussions on the draft bill, the Knesset rejected the
proposal of the religious Agudat Israel party to define "Jew"
halakhically--one whose mother is Jewish or who converts to Judaism-
and Ben-Gurion expressed opposition to such a definition several times.' 3 0
Ultimately, the Knesset did not define "Jew." Some have suggested that
125. Shava, supra note 14, at 141. See also GAVISON, supra note 63, at 61 ("Accordingly, the
questions, 'Who is a Jew'and 'Who is a member ofthe Jewish people'are of decisive importance.").
The number of Jews that have immigrated to Israel under the Law of Return is substantial. Perez,
supra note 115, at 61. Approximately 1.4 million immigrated between 1948 and the mid-1950s
(mostly Holocaust survivors and those living in Muslim states), and almost one million from the
former U.S.S.R. in the 1990s. Id. "It is unlikely that another massive wave of immigrants will arrive in
Israel, short of an unforeseen event." Id. In recent years, immigration under the Law of Return has
been modest: between 10,000 and 15,000 immigrants annually. Id.
126. GAVISON, supra note 63, at 62.
127. Id.
128. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 4. Or, as anther writer put it, with reference to Brother Daniel,
.'You actually sued to be known as a Jew? Give me your hand, brother, and welcome aboard."' Id.
129. Asher Maoz, Who is a Jew? Much Ado About Nothing, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION
STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 75, Ill (Daniel
B. Sinclair ed., 2000).
130. Amnon Rubenstein, The State of Israel as a Jewish State, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION
STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 17, 18 (Daniel B.
Sinclair ed., 2000). Ben-Gurion's opposition to defining "Jew" halakhically for purposes of the Law of
Return was probably "based on his desire for new immigrants to settle in Israel." OSCAR KRAINES,
THE IMPOSSIBLE DILEMMA: WHO IS A JEW IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 2 (1976). As early as the 1940s,
Ben-Gurion had supported free aliyah to "impede the possibility of an anti-Zionist solution to the
Palestine question upon the end of the mandate." GAVISON, supra note 63, at 22. Ben-Gurion's view
gained consensus after World War II. Id. And in the context of the military threats the state faced in its
first years, turning away prospective immigrants who probably had some connection to the Jewish
people and who wished to help may have seemed rather foolish.
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the omission was intentional"3 ' and others claim that the omission allowed
individuals who self-identify as Jews but who were not halakhically
Jewish to "throw in their lot with Israel." 3 2 Still others claim that a
halakhic definition was universally assumed, so that any definition would
have been redundant 3 3 (though this seems difficult to square with the
Knesset's rejection of, and Ben-Gurion's robust opposition to, Agudat
Israel's proposed amendment).
IV. WHO IS A JEW?
"From the year 70 C.E. when the ancient State of Israel was destroyed
by the Romans until the establishment of the modem State of Israel in
1948 the question 'Who Is a Jew?' was hardly ever posed." 34 "In the face
of the Crusader, the Cossack, and the Nazi, it was all the Jew could do
merely to maintain his identity. . . . [T]he emergence of the state has
radically changed the character of the problem."' 3 5
"The term 'Jew' appears in various pieces of legislation: ss. 1, 2, 4A and
4B of the Law of Return; s. 3A(b) of the Population Registry Law 1965;
the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law 1953,
etc."' 3 6 And with respect to these, and other, laws, "[t]he question of 'who
is a Jew' has been the subject of endless, well-known discussions in
Israel." 37 Some of the Supreme Court's decisions on this subject have
"had strong political repercussions.""3 The issue has more than once led
to a cabinet crisis. 39
The recurrence of the problem is hardly surprising. While it had
always had a general relevance-increased somewhat by the
growing secularization of European Jewry in the wake of the
Haskalah-the emergence of the State of Israel as an independent
131. Amnon Rubenstein, Who 'sa Jew and Other Woes, ENCOUNTER 84, 86 (Mar. 1971).
132. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 3-4.
133. Id.
134. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 1.
135. Aharon Lichtenstein, Brother Daniel and the Jewish Fraternity, 12 JUDAISM 260, 261
(Summer 1963). See also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 271 ("The question of what or who a Jew is did
not arise until the end of the eighteenth century, when the advent of Emancipation led to a revaluation
of the nature and essence of Judaism.").
136. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 17.
137. Klein, supra note 115, at 58. See also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 270; Ginossar, supra note
115, at 264 ("Few internal problems of Israel have aroused such heated and widespread controversy,
as that of defining the term 'Jew"'.); Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 260 ('Who is a Jew?' Twice
within recent years this troublesome question has been a matter of public Jewish concern."); Perez,
supra note 115, at 61 ("The disagreement about 'who is a Jew' is one of the biggest controversies in
Israel."); Shava, supra note 14, at 140 ("The question 'Who is a Jew?' raises a thorny problem with
which the Israeli public and the Knesset has been much preoccupied for some twenty years."). But see
JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 56 ("For most Israelis, the issue of 'Who is a Jew' seems about as
interesting as the question 'Who is a Sagittarius?'.
138. Englard, supra note 7, at 190.
139. Shava, supra note 14, at 140.
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socio-political entity, defined by fixed geographical bounds, has
lent its treatment a rather different and generally sharper
character.140
Crucially, the discussion is framed by the traditional Orthodox
understanding of who constitutes the Jewish people. "By the emergence of
rabbinic Judaism in the late Second Temple period, anyone born to a
Jewish mother was automatically considered a Jew." 141 And even now,
"[t]he religious definition of a Jew refers exclusively to two alternative
elements: either the Jewishness of the individual's mother or his personal
conversion to Judaism." 42 Recently, "[t]he fact that emphasis was placed
on the origin of a person and that his beliefs were ignored has proved a
source of furious arguments and sharp accusations." 4 3
One focus of particular difficulty in this respect is the status of
"apostates" under Jewish law, particularly "apostates" to Christianity
because of the different way in which Christianity defines the Church, and
the fact that belonging to community that defines itself by a common
belief is not necessarily in conflict with simultaneously belonging to
another community that defines itself by common ancestry.
The prevailing view' 4 is that "[u]nder halacha. . . , an apostate is
regarded as a Jew, but all rights and privileges accorded a Jew are, so to
speak, suspended." 45  But "[t]he apostate's rejection . .. does not
necessarily imply, however, that ... he is considered a Gentile." 46 In the
view of Orthodox Judaism a converted Jew, hated and despised as he may
be, is nevertheless a Jew. "Judaism, like some nationalities, is a club
which one can join but from which no one can escape."l47
However, "[t]he premise that a person born to a Jewish mother who
140. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 260.
141. Ruth Langer, Jewish Understandings of the Religious Other, 64 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 255,
258 (2003). See also Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 ISRAEL L. REv. 259, 261 (1970)
("Sharing with Roman law the realistic view that mater semper certa est, Jewish religious law views
descent from a Jewish mother as decisive in this connection.").
142. Englard, supra note 7, at 194.
143. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 18. For a recent example, see Petty, supra note 6, at 120-35
(discussing the JFS case in the U.K. Supreme Court).
144. In addition to the majority of the Orthodox movement, both the Reform and Conservative
movements in the United States have formally adopted this position as well. See Drifting Apostate,
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA (July 1986), http://ccarnet.org/responsa/carr-105-
107/ (last visited May 1, 2014); Apostate in the Synagogue, TESHUVOT FOR THE NINETIES: REFORM
JUDAISM'S ANSWERS TO TODAY'S DILEMMAS, http://ccamet.org/responsaltfn-no-5753-13-81-85/ (last
visited May 1, 2014); Gerald L. Zelizer, The Return ofSecond Generation Apostates (June 14, 1995),
http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/zelizer apos
tates.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014) ; Kassel Abelson & Reuven Hammer, The Status of Messianic
Jews (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20I1-2020/abelson-
hammer-messianic-jews.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014).
145. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 263
("Halachically, a meshumad is barred from fulfilling certain tasks.").
146. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 263.
147. Rubenstein supra note 131, at 86.
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converts to Christianity remains halackhically a Jew (even if an apostate)
is not universally shared."1 48 "A baptized Jew is known in Hebrew,
especially in medieval parlance, as 'meshummad' meaning an 'extinct'
one. His close relatives had to undergo for him the mourning rites for the
deceased . . . . [F]or the nation, he was 'dead and buried."'1 49 "The
meshummad was regarded as worse than a thief; he was regarded as the
lowest kind of creature." 5 o
Aharon Lichtenstein, an Orthodox rabbi, has noted the complexity of
this status. "'Who is a Jew?' . . . admits of no single answer. A
meshummad-of what type? A Jew-for what purpose?"5"' Lichtenstein
maintains that there is a "Halachic principle that an apostate can become a
Gentile and that Jewishness is not an absolutely irrevocable status."l 52
And, as will become apparent in the pages to follow, Justice Landau is
similarly convinced.'5 1
But apart from the halakhic view of things, "a significant proportion of
Israeli society . . . defines its Jewishness in secular rather than halakhic
terms . . . [and] it is natural that secular Israelis should seek a legal
definition which is inclusive of their non-halakhic ideology."' 54 Although
there are "relatively few cases where a gap between the two concepts
created a practical problem,"155 several of the "most famous cases in
Israeli judicial history center on the question of who is a Jew."l 56
A. Cases and Legislation
Three seminal cases have tested the bounds of who is considered a Jew
under Israeli civil law. The first, that of Oswald Rufeisen (later, Brother
Daniel) concerns the right of a man, born and raised in the Jewish
community in what became Poland, who performed heroic deeds during
World War II, and who was persecuted as a Jew, but who later also
became a Catholic monk and priest, to return to Israel under the Law of
148. Shava, supra note 14, at 142 n.20 (citing S. Meron, Apostate: Jew or Person of Dual
Religion, 23 HAPRAKLIT 164 (1967), and A.H. SHAKI, WHO IS A JEW IN THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL 154-169 (1976) [Heb.]); see generally Lichtenstein, supra note 135 (suggesting Jewish status
may be lost through total alienation from the Jewish community).
149. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15.
150. Id.
151. Lichtenstein, supra note 135, at 262.
152. Id at 266. As he explained: "[t]here is an apostasy not of action but of person, an
estrangement manifested not merely by the commission of various sins but by the complete severance
of personal bonds with Jewry; by total alienation from the Jewish people and its history as a spiritual
and physical community; and finally, by thorough assimilation into the mainstream of Gentile society.
Such persons are not simply disqualified because of some apostate act. Nor are they merely treated as
if they were foreign. They are-'They have betrayed God, for they have begotten strange children.' . .
There is, then, a point beyond which the apostate cannot go and yet remain a Jew." Id.
153. Jackson, supra note 113, at 123.
154. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 1.
155. Englard, supra note 7, at 194.
156. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 63.
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Return. "The decision of the Court-together with Brother Daniel's
paradoxical identification of himself as a Jew-. . . brought into sharp
focus certain questions of Jewish identity that continue to be vexing both
in Israel and throughout the Diaspora."' 5 7
The second addresses the right of an officer in the Israeli Navy, who
married a non-Jewish woman, to have his children registered as Jews on
their identity cards. The third, following a legislative amendment,
addresses whether Jews who have adopted a belief in Jesus as the
Messiah, but who have not been baptized or otherwise formally affiliated
themselves with Christianity remain Jews for purposes of the Law of
Return. A close examination of these cases offers a view into how the
Supreme Court of Israel understands who is a Jew, and thus what
constitutes "Judaism," and more broadly "religion," under law.
1. Rufeisen (Brother Daniel)
"The story of Oswald Rufeisen is an extraordinary one in itself."1 8
Some of Rufeisen's background is brought out in the Supreme Court's
opinions. But for a full account, I rely heavily here on Nechama Tec's
biography of Rufeisen because his persecution during the Holocaust bears
on one central reason why the State of Israel was created: to provide a
refuge for Jews. A thorough account of Rufeisen's experience is therefore
relevant to the ultimate outcome of his court case. In any event, it is
indeed extraordinary. As one reviewer put it, "[w]ere [Tec's] book not so
heavily documented, one would be inclined to dismiss it as the musings of
an incredibly creative mind. Were it a novel, one might be inclined to
suggest that [she] has strayed into the realm of the improbable."' 59
a. Becoming Brother Daniel
Oswald Rufeisen, a short man with unimposing features and a humble
demeanor who "liked to do favors for people,"'60 was born in Zadziele, a
village in the south of what is now Poland.161 Rufeisen's father had fought
for the Germans in World War I. That, along with the high status that the
German language carried in Poland at the time meant that German was
Rufeisen's primary language at home. Unusually for Jews of limited
means, Rufeisen finished school in 1939 and was awarded his matura.'62
His education and his fluency in German would both prove invaluable.
In September 1939, the Germans invaded Poland. Rufeisen, his brother,
157. Marc Galanter, A Dissent on Brother Daniel, COMMENTARY 10, 10 (July 1963).
158. Jackson, supra note 113 at I15.
159. Deborah E. Lipstadt, Book Review, 97 AM. HIST. REv. 160, 160 (1992).
160. NECHAMA TEC, IN THE LION'S DEN: THE LIFE OF OSWALD RUFEISEN vii-viii (1990).
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id. at 14.
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and their parents fled north before the parents (his mother already ill) gave
Rufeisen and his brother their money and instructed them to continue on
without them. The brothers would never see their parents again.'63
Rufeisen first went to Lviv, in what is now Ukraine, where about one
hundred members of his Zionist youth group, Akiva, had found refuge.
From there, Rufeisen made his way to Vilna (now Vilnius, Lithuania)
where he remained for a time.'" On June 22, 1941, the Germans bombed
Vilna. After initially taking shelter in a basement, Rufeisen, without
saying a word to anyone, went out into the streets to join a makeshift
search-and-rescue team while the bombs continued to fall. 165
Eventually Vilna fell to the Nazis, and Rufeisen was detained. Many of
his companions at this time were murdered,'" but Rufeisen was spared
because he had learned the shoemaking trade as a youth and the Nazis had
confiscated a large quantity of leather that required skilled labor he could
provide. Additionally, because Rufeisen spoke German, he was appointed
the representative for this group of forced laborers, and because of his
education (which was far in excess of most shoemakers) he was also
appointed the shop foreman, taking orders and doing the bookkeeping.' 67
When feeding Rufeisen and the other prisoners became too costly, the
Nazis left them to fend for themselves, but permitted them to live
unconfined. One day, a man Rufeisen passed in the street asked if
Rufeisen would like to come work on his farm, where he would be safe.
Rufeisen hesitated initially, but after seeing a crowd being led off to their
deaths, he resolved to live the rest of the war as a gentile. He knew he
could pass as a Pole, spoke good German, and had a school identification
card that did not identify him as a Jew. He invented a story that he was
half-Polish and half-German, and that his parents were dead.16 8
Just before the supply of leather ran out, and his fellow leather-workers
were all murdered, Rufeisen walked the six miles to the man's farm. He
remained there for several months, but when it became too dangerous to
remain near Vilna, he went East to the home of the farmer's brother, in
Belorussia.'69 The Germans in that area were short of translators, and it
was suggested that he go work for them.170
The head of the regional police dragooned him into the police force to
serve as a personal assistant and translator, and he shortly thereafter was
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 16-17.
165. Id. at 26-27.
166. Id. at 35-37.
167. Id at 38.
168. Id. at 45-47.
169. Id. at 47-61.
170. Id at 61-62.
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made the secretary of the regional police.17 1 Once established, Rufeisen
sought and was granted an official identification card. He could have
claimed to be of German ethnicity (volksdeutsche) based on his fictitious
German father, and this would have carried certain advantages; Rufeisen
concluded that it might also raise additional questions and suspicions.
Instead, he claimed Polish ethnicity, which (since German ethnicity was
an option open to him) resulted in locals viewing him as a patriot and a
principled man who valued his Polish heritage above material gain.' 72
While working for the regional police in Mir, Rufeisen had special
access to information because of his language skills and education, and his
position as secretary.' 73 When he recognized a Jew he knew from Vilna,
he began to construct a network to provide information to the Jews in the
area. When Rufeisen learned that the Mir ghetto was to be completely
liquidated on a particular date, he organized an "anti-partisan raid" that
took the would-be persecutors in the wrong direction, to fight Russian
partisans that did not exist, leaving time for those in the ghetto to escape.
Although Rufeisen had also armed the Jews in the ghetto, fewer than 300
escaped successfully.174
After the raid, Rufeisen was denounced to his superiors.' He admitted
that he was a Jew and started running. He found shelter in a convent,
where he read the New Testament and various Carmelite publications.' 76
Less than three weeks later, Rufeisen asked the mother superior to baptize
him.17 7 He felt that it was not a rejection of his Jewish heritage; he wanted
a stronger connection to the New Testament, which he read as a Jewish
document. In particular, the account of the death and resurrection of Jesus
helped him to cope with the horrors of the Holocaust.'17  He had less
interest in the Church as an institution and the writings of Catholic
theologians. 79
When he felt he might be placing the nuns at risk, Rufeisen left the
convent and joined partisan militants.'80 Initially believing Rufeisen to be
a German spy, the partisans condemned him to death, but he was saved by
one of the Jews of Mir who had been able to escape the ghetto on account
of Rufeisen's assistance.' 8 ' After the Russians forced a German retreat and
reclaimed the area, they indicated that they had no interest in detaining
171. Id at 66, 85.
172. Id at 87-88,
173. Id. at 89-91.
174. Id. at 132-148.
175. Id. at 151-56.
176. Id at 166.
177. Id. at 169.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. Id. a 191.
181. See infra, note 196, at 25-26 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
232 [Vol. 26:211
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss2/2
2014]
Rufeisen despite his former employment with the Germans. Rufeisen then
made his way to Czerna where he applied to join a Carmelite
monastery.18 2 He chose the Carmelites deliberately because he knew from
his time with the nuns they had a chapter in Israel.183 After a period of
preparation, Rufeisen took his final vows as a monk in 1949 at age 27.18
He was later asked to prepare for the priesthood, and became a priest as
well.1ss
After many unsuccessful attempts, the Carmelites gave him permission
to relocate to Israel. But when he met with the Israeli ambassador, he was
told that he could not emigrate to Israel as a Jew because he was a
Christian monk, and that the determination of Jewish status under Israeli
law was a contentious point in Israel at the time.'8 1 Instead, Rufeisen was
granted a one-year visa based on his brother's residency there.' 87 He
entered the Carmelite monastery on Mt. Carmel in Haifa, to serve as a
counselor to members of mixed marriages.' 88
In Israel, Rufeisen was received warmly by those he knew during the
war, even if they were unhappy or disappointed by his conversion to
Christianity. He was invited to family gatherings by his brother and treated
as a close friend by many of his former Akiva companions. But, while
loved dearly, he was also an outsider.189 Not recognized as a Jew by the
Israeli authorities before leaving Poland, he applied for an oleh's
certificate after arriving, and was refused.
b. Before the Supreme Court
After receiving permission from the relevant authorities in Rome,
Rufeisen sought injunctive relief against the Minister of the Interior before
the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice. He claimed that
because, despite his conversion, he remained a Jew as a matter of halakha,
he was entitled to residency and citizenship under the Law of Return.
"Under halachic law he was without question a Jew, born of a Jewish
mother. The tradition was 'once a Jew, always a Jew': you could be a
wicked Jew, a deserting Jew, a treacherous Jew, but a Jew you
remained." 90
In Rufeisen, the Court had to decide "whether the term 'Jew' in the Law
182. TEC, supra note 160, at 207.
183. See infra, note 196, at 26 (opinion of Berinson, J.) (quoting Rufeisen's passport application).
184. TEC, supra note 160, at 213.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 220.
187. Id. at 221.
188. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 3. Some Orthodox communities concluded that Rufeisen had
come to Israel to convert Jews to Christianity. TEC, supra note 160, at 225.
189. TEC, supra note 160, at 224.
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of Return carried a religious-halakhic, or secular meaning."' 9' One
observer suggested that "[f]rorn the opening argument until the last word
of the judgment, the courtroom was less the scene of legal debate than a
pageant of 2,000 years of Jewish history, philosophy, and religious
thought; for the judges were being called upon to define-although in the
admittedly specific context of the Law of Return-what the broad concept
of Jewishness meant." 92 "Appearing before the Supreme Court in brown
habit and sandals," Rufeisen spoke of "the sufferings and ordeals he
endured as a Jew and the pride he felt in being Jewish and in the State of
Israel.",9 3
But suffering and pride were not enough to carry the day. "[T]he
Supreme Court ruled that an individual who was born a Jew but converted
to Catholicism and became a monk was not entitled to benefit from the
Law of Return and could not be registered in the population register as
being of Jewish nationality." 94 On Rufeisen's identity card, under the
heading of "nationality," it says not "Jewish," but "Not clear."' 9 5
The Court, composed of five justices, produced four separate
opinions.'96 All members of the Court agreed that the Law of Return was a
secular law; there was no disagreement that the halakhic definition did not
govern the interpretation.197 The Court held that because "the Law of
Return is secular legislation, . . . [it] must be interpreted according to
secular principles."' 98 Focusing on the need for a secular definition of
"Jew" for a secular piece of legislation "enable[d] [the Court] expressly to
affirm the nontheocratic nature of the state." 99 And "since the Law of
Return contained no definition of 'Jew,' ordinary usage, 'the language of
men,"' the Court determined, "must be the governing factor." 200
191. Shava, supra note 14, at 142.
192. Slovenko, supra note 18, at 5 (internal quotation omitted).
193. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 24.
194. Klein, supra note 115, at 59.
195. TEC, supra note 160, at 231. See also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88 n.6 (noting that
Rufeisen was allowed to settle in Israel and acquire Israeli citizenship, but not under the Law of
Return as a Jew); Klein, supra note 115, at 59 ("Rufeisen did actually apply for and was granted
Israeli nationality through the naturalization process.").
196. HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 PD 2428 [1962] (Isr.), translated in
SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME 1-34 (Asher Felix
Landau ed., 197 1) [hereinafter Ruifeisen]. Justice Manny concurred in the opinions of Justices Silberg
and Landau. Id. at 24.
197. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43 (noting that "the majority
opinion espoused an objective secular test-'in common parlance' and 'as used as the present time by
the people' [while] H. Cohn J. favored the adoption of a subjective secular test") (citations omitted).
198. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15.
199. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 64.
200. LESLIE, supra note 190, at 39. See also JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 65 (noting that for the
majority, "the secular meaning of the term 'Jew' in the Law of Return is to be derived from the
common understanding of the 'ordinary simple Jew."'); L.C. Green, Book Review, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
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The Justices split, however, on how to determine the ordinary, secular
meaning of the word "Jew." The majority favored a combination of what
they viewed as common understandings used in everyday language
coupled with some notion of traditional bounds of collective identity.20'
Applying this test, the Court concluded that the secular view "treated
conversion as decisive and excluded the convert from the Jewish
community.202 Justice Cohn, dissenting, favored a wholly subjective
approach based on the individual's preference.203
Justice Silberg began, after noting Rufeisen's deeds during the
Holocaust, to review the religious law on the matter, and concluded that
the Jewishness of a convert is "indivisible and absolute." 204 But whereas
the term "Jew" means a Jew according to Jewish law under the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, Silberg saw the same
word as bearing a "secular meaning, as it is usually understood in common
parlance-and this I emphasize-by the ordinary simple Jew."205 He
explained that the purpose of defining the jurisdiction of the rabbinical
courts is to make Jewish law applicable to Jews, and defining Jews any
other way than by halakha would defeat the purpose of the law.206 On the
other hand, "[fjor all its immense historical importance, [the Law of
Return] is a secular law, and in the absence of definition either in the
statute itself or in the decided cases, we must interpret its terms according
to their ordinary meaning." 207 The question then, is whether the "ordinary
Jewish meaning of the term 'Jew' . . . include[s] a Jew who has become a
Christian?" 208
Silberg held the answer was a clear "no." 209 "Justice Silberg, writing for
the majority, concluded that the communal understanding of the term does
not include a Jew who has become a Christian." 210 He suggested that
"Jew" and "Christian" are incompatible statuses. 211 "The deeply rooted
belief that Jew and Christian are contradictory terms is shared alike by
simple people and scholars."2 12 On this view, Rufeisen "has deserted, not
merely lapsed." 213 Framing the issue of return in the context of Zionism,
Silberg explains that it is the Jewish people's "historic culture as Jews
201. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43.
202. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
203. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5; Shava, supra note 14, at 142-43.
204. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 2-10 (opinion of Silberg, J.).




209. Id. at 11.
210. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 66.
211. Jackson, supra note 113, at 120.
212. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 12 (opinion of Silberg, J.).
213. Jackson, supra note 113, at 122.
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which entitles them to the land." 2 14 Silberg wrote:
Whether he is religious, non-religious or anti-religious, the Jew
living in Israel is bound, willingly or unwillingly, by an umbilical
cord to historical Judaism from which he draws his language and
its idiom, whose festivals are his own to celebrate, and whose great
thinkers and spiritual heroes-not the least of whom are the
martyrs of 1096 and those who perished at the stake in Spain-
nourish his national pride. 215
Because the adoption of Christianity is inconsistent with the
maintenance of Jewish cultural ties, Silberg concluded that Rufeisen had
forfeited his right to return to Israel as a member of the Jewish people.216
Justice Landau joined in Silberg's opinion and added some commentary
of his own. 2 17 "[T]he main thrust of the judgment of Landau J. is to stress
the importance for this case of the manner of construction of Jewish
identity by the founders of Zionism." 2 18 He suggested that the position of
halakha toward the convert was not one of forbearance, but of contempt,
and thus Rufeisen should not have invoked it in aid of his cause.2 19 In any
event, he agreed that the question was not to be decided by religious law
because the Law of Return "is a secular Law of the State of Israel."220
Looking to the Zionist roots of the state, Landau noted that Herzl had
refused admission to the Zionist Organization of a Jew who had converted
to Christianity,22 and that Ahad Haam222 rejected the notion that even an
entirely secular Israeli could deny the influence and importance of
historical Jewish practice on its current constitution-to deny that past
would be to deny what made Jewish nationalism Jewish.223 Thus, Landau
concluded that "[a] Jew who, by changing his religion, cuts himself off
from the national past of his people ceases thereby to be a Jew in the
national sense to which the Law of Return gives expression."224 "The
stress placed by Landau J. upon identification with the religious sentiment
of the past is not based upon any assertion of the religious value of the
past, but rather upon its sociological function in constituting group
214. Id. It has been suggested that the case was regarded as a cause c6l6bre, in part, because it
"pose[d] questions, not only about Jewish identity, but also about Zionism, and about the relations
between them." Id. at 120.
215. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at I (opinion of Silberg, J.).
216. See Jackson, supra note 113, at 122.
217. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 18-19 (opinion of Landau, J.).
218. Jackson, supra note 113, at 120.
219. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 19 (opinion of Landau, J.).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 20.
222. For more on the intellectual contribution of Ahad Haam to Zionism, see BATNITZKY, supra
note 22, at 155-60.
223. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 20-21 (opinion of Landau, J.).
224. Id. at 22.
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identity." 225 In becoming a Christian, Landau, J., concluded that Rufeisen
"excluded himself from the common fate of the Jewish people and has
linked his destiny to other forces whose precepts he honours both in
thought and in observance."226
Justice Berinson likewise "explained the popular view as based upon the
(mutual) denial of community which occurs when a Jew converts to
another religion." 227 And, like Silberg, Berinson took the relevant
understanding of "Jew" to be that of the man on the street.228
Berinson began by observing, almost wryly, that the "usual case" of
conversion-"for reasons to which we have become accustomed"
assimilation, mixed marriages, improvement of social or material status,
public career, etc., do not apply; "material comforts and worldly
pleasures" hold no attraction for the monk.229 After summarizing the
particulars of Rufeisen's conduct during the War and his attempts to
immigrate to Israel, 230 Berinson noted that he was not free to simply grant
the request, which he would if he were so empowered. 231 He noted that the
parties agreed that the Law of Return must be given a "secular-national,
and not a religious connotation," but diverged on what that connotation
was. 232 He further conceded that had Rufeisen been captured by the Nazis
after his conversion, the conversion would have made no difference "and
he would have fallen victim to them as a Jew."233 Interestingly, Berinson
suggests that "had he declared that he believed in Buddhism which does
not require a change of religion and lived as a Buddhist monk, he would
apparently have been recognized as a Jew. Thus as a Buddhist monk yes,
but as a Christian monk no!" 234 Berinson also maintains that Ahad Haam
would not have viewed a Jew who converted to another religion, but who
in all other respects was deeply Zionist, as outside the bounds of the
Jewish people.235
But despite this, Berinson concluded that "[t]he people themselves ...
have decided otherwise. . . . For them a Jew who has embraced another
religion has withdrawn himself not only from the Jewish faith but also
from the Jewish nation and has no place in the Jewish community. "236 The
common understanding of the Jewish people is that "a Jew and a Christian
225. Jackson, supra note 113, at 126.
226. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.).
227. Jackson, supra note 113, at 128.
228. Id at 126.
229. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 24 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
230. Id at 24-26.
231. Id at 27-28.
232. Id. at 28.
233. Id. at 29.
234. Id at 31.
235. Id at 31-32.
236. Id at 32.
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cannot reside in one person" 237 because of "the (mutual) denial of
community which occurs when a Jew converts to another religion." 238 it
was this "popular meaning" that Berinson believed the Knesset intended
when it enacted the Law of Return. 23 9 Justice Berinson noted that even as
early as 1947, the position of the Jewish Agency, in testimony given
before the United Nations Special Committee for Palestine, was that
formal conversion to another religion would exclude one from the Jewish
people for political purposes.240
Justice Cohn dissented.24 1 He agreed that according to Jewish religious
law a converted Jew remains a Jew, agreed that the Law of Return (and
related registration laws) should not be construed according to Jewish
religious law, and agreed that the Law of Return should not be construed
to negate the principles on which the State of Israel was founded.24 2 But he
differed on whether permitting Rufeisen to become an Israeli citizen under
the Law of Return would do so. Instead, he would permit anyone who
declared in good faith that he was a Jew the privileges granted by the Law
of Return, regardless of whether the applicant had no other religion. 24 3 Just
as Jewish religious law cannot claim to be the proper lens through which
to view the Law of Return's ambiguous terms, Cohn held that it would be
equally improper to consider the religious law of any other religion, as his
colleagues had done in examining the effect of Rufeisen's participation in
Catholic sacraments, in determining who is a Jew for purposes of secular
legislation.244
Rufeisen's aim in going to court was to establish a precedent.245 He was
offered immediate citizenship by the Minister of the Interior if he would
drop the case, but refused.246 Later, Rufeisen regretted having taken the
case to court. He suggested, "had my position been accepted this would
have created a revolution in conventional concepts."247
The Rufeisen decision, although its result was broadly applauded in
Israel, was not without its critics and detractors. For example, by tying the
legal definition of "Jew" to common understanding, some complained that
the "majority's definition was both vague and impermanent." 24 8 It also
turned on the supposition that "a single 'common' meaning [of 'Jew']
237. Id
238. Jackson, supra note 113, at 128.
239. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 32 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
240. Id.
241. Id at 13-18 (Cohn, J., dissenting).
242. Id at 13-14.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id at 16.
245. TEC, supra note 160, at 227.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 231
248. LESLIE, supra note 190, at 39.
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exists and can be found." 24 9 And even assuming such a definition can be
discerned, a further question remains with respect to who is permitted to
offer an answer in order to determine the common understanding.
"Israelis? If so, only Jewish Israelis, or, since this is a secular law, all
Israelis? The Diaspora as well? Contemporary Jews or those throughout
history?" 25 0
Moreover, apart from problems of determining who is a Jew according
to a common understanding, the majority's reasoning with respect to
collective identity "rests on the theory that Jewishness and Christianity are
incompatible."251 And this theory rests in turn on the premise that while
irreligion does not vitiate one's connection to the Jewish people,
conversion to Christianity does.252 This conception of Jewishness "tends to
visualize all of Jewish history in relation to Christianity."253 Finally, the
decision "in no way answers the question of who is a Jew under the Law
of Return; it only asserts that an apostate such as Brother Daniel is not a
Jew."254
2. Shalit
The next case was not long in coming. The use of halakhic standards to
determine who is a Jew for purposes of registration was a longstanding
controversy. Initially there may have been a tacit understanding that
halakhic standards governed, but as early assumptions that determination
of Jewish status would be a simple matter turned out to be incorrect, any
understanding that previously existed began to break down before the state
was a decade old.
"On March 10, 1958, Minister of the Interior Bar-Yehuda from the
Labour Party, issued new guidelines on registration, whereby 'a person
who declares himself to be Jewish, in good faith, should be registered as
Jewish.' . . . As a reaction to those guidelines all the religious parties left
the Coalition."2 5  The prime minister established a committee to study the
situation, and the committee consulted eminent scholars and public
249. Galanter, supra note 157, at 11.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 15.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 66.
255. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 20; Lawrence S. Nesis, Who is a Jew?, 4 MANITOBA L.J. 53,
61 (1970). Bar-Yehuda's guidelines formalized the existing practice of accepting a declaration that
one was a Jew as sufficient for registration. For example, in 1953, Abraham Samuelov, a Catholic
Monk, was registered as Jewish on the basis of his own representation that he was a Jew of the
Catholic faith. Z. Warhaftig, Who is a Jew?, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW,
JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL 23, 25 (Daniel B. Sinclair ed.,
2000). However, under directives dating to 1956, children of mixed marriages were to be registered
under their mother's religion. Nesis, supra, at 62.
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figures. 256 A significant majority of those consulted favored the halakhic
definition. 257 "Forty-five replies were received, and of them, thirty-seven
scholars argued in favor of the halakhic test. . . . Only three replies
supported the view that the meaning of 'Jew' in a secular and in a
religious context were different." 2 5 8 The prime minister then assigned a
member of a religious party to be Minister of the Interior and henceforth
halakhic criteria were applied to registration as a matter of policy. 259
Benjamin (or Binyamin) Shalit was born in Haifa in 1935.260 While
studying in Edinburgh, he met and married his wife Anne (or possibly
Ann), who was not Jewish and who did not convert to Judaism. 26 ' Both
husband and wife were non-believers, and their marriage was a civil
one. 26 2 The couple returned to Israel in 1960, Anne became a naturalized
citizen, and together they had a son in 1964 and a daughter in 1967.263 In
the meantime, Shalit, a psychologist, had become an officer in the Israeli
Navy. 264
The Shalits registered their children in accordance with the Registration
of Inhabitants Ordinance 1949 (the forerunner to the Population Registry
Law 1965).265 "Registration, as such, does not confer any benefit upon the
persons registered, nor does it alter their legal status in any way. It means
nothing beyond the fact of registration."2 66 The details to be registered
included the children's dat (literally "law" but connoting "religion") and
le 'uM.2 67 Le'um is "an untranslatable term which was probably derived
from Central and Eastern Europe. It means something akin to
'peoplehood' and designates a common ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
256. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 4.
257. Id. at 4-5; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 292.
258. Rubenstein, supra note 130, at 20-2 1.
259. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5.
260. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53.
261. Id. Anne was, however, the granddaughter of Sir Patrick Geddes, a Zionist who collaborated
with Chaim Weizmann to establish the Hebrew University. See Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84.
262. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46; Nesis, supra note 255, at 53 (noting the Shalits considered
themselves atheists).
263. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46.
264. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46. By the time of the Supreme
Court's decision in 1970, he had risen to the rank of Lieutenant Commander. Rubenstein, supra note
131, at 84; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 26.
265. Nesis, supra note 255, at 60.
266. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84.
267. Nesis, supra note 255, at 53. It should be noted that "[t]he Hebrew language does not have a
word for 'religion."' Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi. The word dat, which in Modem Hebrew denotes the
concept of religion, is a Persian loan-word that entered ancient Hebrew in late biblical times, and
which originally referred to simply "law," i.e., the law of the gentile king. Id. at xxvi & n.5. In Modem
Hebrew, however, it denotes "divine law." Id "[T]he concept, as used today, is a translation from
European languages rather than an intrinsic development." Id. As will be explained more fully below,
"[t]he use of the term 'religion' in a Jewish context is . .. an external imposition rather than an
authentic expression of the intrinsic nature of Judaism." Id. at xxviii.
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origin."2 68 "Ethnic group," "nationality," and "people" have all been used
269as English translations.
In keeping with their atheistic convictions, the Shalits declined to
designate a religion for their son's registration, and listed his le'um as
"Jewish." The registration clerk amended the religion to "Father-Jewish,
Mother-non-Jewish" and amended the entry for le'um to read "not
registered." 27 0 Later, a different clerk, following new guidance, reversed
these designations when the Shalits' daughter was registered. For her, the
clerk designated "Father-Jewish, Mother-non-Jewish" under le 'um, and
"not registered" under religion.271
In February 1968, Shalit applied to the Supreme Court to order the
Minister of the Interior to register both children as "Jews" under le'um and
"without religion" under dat.272 After the first hearing, a special court of
five justices was convened, but later, the President of the Court, Justice
Agranat, took the unprecedented step of convening the entire court to hear
the case. 273 "As soon as Shalit applied to the Court, the judges sensed that
they were dealing with an explosive issue."274 "Both parties were armed
mainly with non-legal authorities, invoking the writings of Jewish
philosophers, statesmen, and scholars. It was the least legal case ever
argued." 275
Shalit argued, first, that the registration must be made in accordance
with the declaration of the declarant, and that the registration clerk was not
authorized to change what was declared.276 Second, he maintained that
one's le'um is something different from one's religion, and that belonging
to the Jewish ethnic group need not be determined halakhically, which
268. Rubenstein, supra note 13 1, at 84. See also id. at 103 n. I (noting near-equivalency with the
German concept of Nationalitdt).
269. Nesis, supra note 255, at 54.
270. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46.
271. Id. This was in error, and the Minister of the Interior later specified that he was ready to
correct the daughter's registration to be identical with the son's. Nesis, supra note 255, at 55.
272. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46; Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
273. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88; Shava, supra note 14, at 144. Other sources suggest that
the Court at that time had a tenth member who was not on the panel. Gideon Hausner, The Rights of
the Individual in Court, 9 ISRAEL L. REV. 477, 490 (1974); KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46. The
Supreme Court typically hears cases in panels of three justices. Exceptionally, a panel of five justices
may be convened, as happened in Rufeisen. Larger panels have been convened only twice: a panel of
seven was seated in HCJ 51/80 Cohen v. Rabbinical High Court of Appeals 35(2) PD 8 [1980] (Isr.),
and the panel of nine that heard Shalit has never been replicated. The reason why larger panels are
convened so infrequently is the staggering workload of the court. In contrast to most courts of last
resort (and especially the Supreme Court of the United States, which exercises almost exclusively
discretionary jurisdiction), the Supreme Court of Israel not only hears appeals as of right from most
civil and criminal matters, but also acts (in its capacity as the High Court of Justice) as a court of first
instance in most public matters. Gidon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal With a Primary Question That
the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy Over Who Is a Jew as an Illustration, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1233, 1241 n.30, 1242 n.34 (2006).
274. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
2 7 5. Id.
276. Nesis, supra note 255, at 55.
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could not fully apply to Israeli conditions, but could be evidenced by
subjective identification with Jewish-Israeli culture and values.277 Shalit
asked whether "Kamal Nimri, the terrorist, [would] be regarded as a Jew
while my children, who get a Hebrew and Israeli education and who
would fight for Israel, [would] be considered as non-Jews?" 278 The
Attorney General, in response, tied the Jewish religion to the Jewish
nation as inseparable elements of Jewish existence, with religion taking
primary importance.279
In November 1968, after the case had been under consideration for
several months, the entire court asked the Government to intervene by
deleting the requirement that le'um be listed in registration documents. 280
"The court's plea was brought to the cabinet and rejected in what was later
described by one of the judges as 'a summary procedure."' 2 8 1 It was
reported that the rejection was based upon security grounds: le'um is the
only way to quickly and easily distinguish between Jews, Arabs, and
Druze because dat is not printed on identity cards.282
The Shalit majority held by a vote of five-four that le'um, as
nationality/ethnicity, need not follow the halakhic view of who belonged
to the Jewish people. 283 And "[s]ince the issue was only registration and
not a substantive right such as citizenship, the majority was also prepared
to adopt the purely subjective definition advocated by Cohn J. in
Rufeisen."284 The Court ordered the Minister of the Interior to register the
277. Id. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 46 ("What Shalit, in effect, was trying to
accomplish was to have the Supreme Court declare that there is a Jewish nationality separate from the
Jewish religion.").
278. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88. Nimri was the commander of the Fatah movement in East
Jerusalem. See TOM SEGEV, 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR, AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE
MIDDLE EAST 499 (2005) (Jessica Cohen trans., 2007). Nimri's mother was Jewish; his father, an
Arab Muslim.
279. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88; KRAINES, supra note 130, at 47.
280. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88-89.
281. Idat89.
282. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89; Shalit, infra note 283, at 106 (Kister, J., dissenting). This
would confirm Ben-Gurion's 1958 explanation that "[i]n light of our special situation, when there is
no practical possibility of a thorough and permanent control of the country's borders to prevent the
entry of infiltrators from the hostile neighboring countries, who are a source of grave and constant
danger to the peace of the country and its population, it is essential that a legal resident in Israel should
be able to identify himself at all times by means of a document supplied by an official authority."
Nesis, supra note 255, at 61 (internal quotation omitted). Under the Registry of Inhabitants Ordinance
1949, during times of emergency, every male resident was required to carry his identity card. Id. at 60.
283. See HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) PD 477 [1969] (Isr.), translated in
SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME 35-191 (Asher Felix
Landau ed., 1971) [hereinafter "Shalit"]. The nine justices produced eight opinions: Justices Sussman,
Berinson, Witkon, and Manny agreed (with Manny simply joining in the opinions of Sussman and
Cohn) that the primary question concerned the authority of the registration officer; Cohn concurred,
but would accord less authority to the registration officer than the other justices in the majority;
President of the Supreme Court Agranat, Deputy President Silberg, and Justices Landau and Kister
dissented, addressing the question of nationality more directly. See also Green, supra note 200, at 191.
284. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 7; see also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 84 ("As legal battles go,
the Shalit case was ostensibly marginal.").
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Shalit children as Jews under le'um.285 Justice Sussman, delivering the
opinion of the Court, explained that "[t]he determination of the affiliation
of an individual to a given religion or a given nation derives principally
from the subjective feeling of the person concerned."286
"Sussman (and even more explicitly, Justice Berinson) underscored the
secular orientation of the earlier Court. It is implicit in their opinions that
the divisive nature of the issue raised by Shalit effectively removed the
last barrier to the adoption of a secular and subjective interpretation." 287
Sussman explained that the registration officer refused to register the
Shalit children as Jewish by nationality because the category
"embraces . .. the norms of Jewish nationality and of the Jewish religion
together, and accordingly no person is to be regarded as being of Jewish
nationality if the Jewish religion does not regard him as a Jew at all."288
And, in turn, the respondents claimed that the Jewish religion embraced
only a person whose mother is Jewish or who has been converted
according to religious law, and who is not also a member of another
religion. 28 9
Sussman disclaimed any suggestion that the Court was determining who
was a Jew; rather, he proposed that the only matter before the Court was
whether the registration officer was required to register the children in
accordance with the instructions of the parents, or whether "they can be
justified in their refusal."2 90 Sussman held that the registration officer had
not been statutorily authorized to "decide any question," and as a citizen
who provides information to the officer in accordance with law is
presumed to be stating the truth (unless the statement is clearly false on its
face, as an adult wishing to register as a five-year old child).29 ' Sussman
explained that while the registration officer was acting in accordance with
earlier directives of the Minister of the Interior, they are administrative
only, and to the extent they are inconsistent with or extend beyond powers
granted by statute, they are invalid.292
After noting that the purpose of registration is largely statistical, and
that some matters of registration are largely subjective, and therefore the
legislative purpose was not effectuated by refusing to register bona fide
285. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89.
286. KRAINES, supra note 130, at 48.
287. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 72.
288. Shalit, supra note 283, at 64.
289. Id. It is interesting to note that the respondents asserted the primacy of the halakhic
definition, while at the same time narrowing that definition to exclude members of other religions
using, essentially, the secular definition the Court created in Rufeisen. See id. at 72 ("[Bly not
registering as a Jew anyone born a Jew who is a member of another religion... they deny the very
religious principle according to which they purport to act.").
290. Id. at 64-65 (opinion of Sussman, J.).
291. Idat66.
292. Id. at 66-67.
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claims, Sussman turned to application of Rufeisen.293 Sussman recalled
that Rufeisen established that the term "Jew," as a legal term of art, has no
settled meaning; Rufeisen was Jewish under the Rabbinical Courts
Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953, which was based on
halakha, but not under the Law of Return of 1950.294 Sussman concludes
that given the largely statistical purposes of the Population Registry Law,
the malleable and subjective nature of "nationality," and the limited scope
of the registration officer's discretion, the officer was required to register
the Shalit children in accordance with the application.2 95
Justice Berinson concurred in Sussman's opinion,296 but proceeded to
explain why his judgment in favor of Shalit was consistent with his views
expressed in Rufeisen.29 7 Berinson explained that in Rufeisen, he
concluded that the definition of "Jew" for purposes of the Law of Return
was not the halakhic definition, but instead rested on popular
understanding. 298 Applying the same principle here, Berinson concluded
that "[t]he term 'nation' is to be interpreted according to the popular
notion of our place and times."299 Berinson found it inconceivable that the
children of an officer of the Israeli Defense Forces, raised in Israel, and
whose mother, while not Jewish, comes from Zionist stock and has
"bound her fate with that of the people of the State of Israel," would not be
recognized as of Jewish nationality while the "head of the terrorists in East
Jerusalem, born of a Jewish woman and a Moslem, who has striven to
destroy and annihilate the State of Israel" would be "considered a son of
the covenant." 3 00
The bulk of Justice Witkon's opinion was spent refuting Justice
Landau's contention that the non-Jewishness of Shalit's children was
evident on the face of the application, and explaining that the subjective
notion of Jewish nationality divorced from halakhic standards was a
"legitimate and serious" one.301
Justice Cohn, like the other judges in the majority, concluded that the
Jewishness of the Shalit children did not present itself for consideration,
and that the question was limited to the authority of the registration officer
applying the Minister of the Interior's directives. 302 "[I]t is immaterial
whether by virtue of instructions or directives he received from the
Minister of the Interior, or out of his abundant knowledge of the law or his
293. Id. at 67-71.
294. Id. at 71-72.
295. Id. at 72-77.
296. Id. at 185 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
297. Id at 186.
298. Id.
299. Id at 188.
300. Id. at 187-88.
301. Id. at 98-102 (opinion of Witkon, J.).
302. Id. at 40-41 (opinion of Cohn, J.).
244 [Vol. 26:211
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss2/2
2014]
erudition in the Talmud and the Poskim, the registration officer knows (or
thinks he knows) with certainty what is or is not the 'nationality' of the
person concerned."303 Cohn, in accordance with views on subjective
identity he expressed in Rufeisen, held that "the notification of the Jewish
'nationality' of the petitioners' children was given bona fide since the
petitioners believe with perfect faith that their children's nationality is
Jewish, and the contrary directives of the Minister of the Interior certainly
cannot bind them."3 04
Justice Manny simply concurred with both Sussman and Cohn.30 s
President of the Supreme Court Agranat, dissenting, concurred in large
part with Justice Landau. 306 The President rejected the subjective approach
to nationality championed by Cohn, suggesting that this was perhaps even
required by Rufeisen (although he did not address what roles Rufeisen's
conversion away from Judaism and the fact that it was to another religion,
and Christianity specifically, nor the difference between the terms
"nationality" in the Population Registry Law and "Jew" in the Law of
Return).307 Agranat discussed at length the reasons why, in his view, it was
not such a simple matter to disassociate religion from nationality, and why
Jewish religious law was still a relevant criterion in determining Jewish
nationality even for a secular law.30s He suggests that the contrary view
"had its source in the school of liberalism and individualism which teaches
that religious faith is a matter of conscience falling in the individual's
private domain." 30 After reviewing some of the arguments on both
sides,310 Agranat concluded that the issue presented depends so heavily on
ideological views that judicial resolution of the case would essentially
amount to rule by caprice. 31' Accordingly, Agranat would have let stand
the Minister's decision, owing to its lack of amenability to judicial review.
Deputy President of the Supreme Court Silberg explained at the outset
that "[t]he problem in all its magnitude and gravity is the substance of the
concept 'Jew': can a person belong to the Jewish people without being at
the very same time an adherent of the Jewish religion?" 312 Silberg
contended that the secular definition of "Jew" elucidated in Rufeisen was
inapplicable because in Rufeisen, the secular usage was what the Knesset
was assumed to have intended. Here, the issue was "nationality," and so
he suggested that if there was no definition of "Jew" in general usage
303. Id. at 44.
304. Id. at 47.
305. Id. at 148 (opinion of Manny, J.).
306. Id. (Agranat, President of the Supreme Court, dissenting).
307. Id. at 149.
308. Id. at 150-64.
309. Id. at 167.
310. Id. at 170-78.
311. Id. at 181.
312. Id. at 49 (Silberg, Deputy President of the Supreme Court, dissenting).
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other than that of halakha, then the halakhic definition would be applied
notwithstanding the similarly secular nature of the Population Registry
Law."' Silberg then proceeded to consider what test should be applied to
determine nationality. He concluded that there existed no Israeli nation,
only an Israeli state and a much larger Jewish nation. 314 Suggesting that
the abandonment of religious principles would spell the end of the Jewish
people, he reached the conclusion that the Jewish nation determined its
membership according to religious precepts.315
After reprising the basic facts,316 Justice Landau noted that Shalit made
two arguments: (1) that the registration must be made by the registration
officer upon the notification provided, and the registration officer is not
empowered to alter that notification; and (2) that even if the registration
officer had the power to amend the notification, Shalit's notification to the
registration officer that his children were of Jewish nationality was
accurate. 317 This case, therefore, squarely presented the question whether
in the State of Israel it was possible to be Jewish by nationality (in the
ethnic sense as opposed to citizenship), while not being a member of the
Jewish people as a religious matter.
Landau thought that Rufeisen could not answer the matter. In Rufeisen,
the Court had no trouble concluding that popular sentiment would exclude
a Jew by descent who had converted to Christianity from registering as a
Jew. But no similar consensus view of "the man on the street" existed with
respect to the status of children of mixed marriages where the mother was
not Jewish, yet the father was, and the children acculturated Israelis.319
Landau, like several of the other judges, concluded that there was little the
Court could do to resolve an ideological dispute that turns a "court of law
into a court of judges."320 Consonant with the views of Agranat on matters
ideological, Landau concluded that "the decision must rest with the
Knesset which represents the people and, so long as the Knesset has not
decided otherwise, with the Government which is entrusted with matters
of policy and depends upon the confidence of the Knesset." 32 1
Justice Kister delivered a lengthy opinion ranging from the meaning of
"nationality" in the context of political theory,322 to the treatment of mixed
marriages in Jewish law, 32 3 to psychological studies on maternal
313. Id at 50.
314. Id. at 53.
315. Id. at 53-62.
316. Id. at 78-79 (Landau, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 79.
318. Id.
319. Id at 80-81.
320. Id at 82-83.
321. Id at 94.
322. Id. at 108-13 (Kister, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 118.
246 [Vol. 26:211
36
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss2/2
2014]
attachment of children.324 He canvassed the dilemma of European Jews
during the emancipation and the desire on the part of the Reform
movement to reduce Jewish life to religion (in order to make room for an
adopted nationality and full political rights).3 25 Kister concluded that the
views of the scholars consulted that led to the new directives were a
sufficient ground to defer to the government, and that in any event the idea
that nationality (as ethnicity) could be acquired simply by "feeling" was
incredulous.3 26
3. Amendment No. 2
Although Rufeisen and Shalit may appear somewhat contradictory, at
least insofar as they reach different results (Shalit winning and Rufeisen
losing their respective claims to Jewish status), on closer inspection, the
cases reveal a consistent adherence to what the Court considers a "secular"
definition of Israeli nationality.327 In effect, the Court determined that
religion and nationality were separable, and that based on prevailing
norms, (1) halakhic non-Jews may be considered Jews for purposes of
registration (as in Shalit), and (2) halakhic Jews may be considered non-
Jews for purposes of the Law of Return (as in Rufeisen). Leaving aside for
the moment the difference between registration, which carries no
substantive rights, and the Law of Return, which carries immediate and
automatic citizenship, the two decisions reflect, sometimes at pains, that
the religious view of who is a Jew matters very little apart from questions
reserved to the rabbinical courts. This did not sit well with everyone.
Despite the fact that "[o]f the five majority justices, only one, Justice
Berinson, stated clearly that the Shalit children were Jewish in the secular
sense evolved in the Brother Daniel case,"328 and "only three out of the
nine judges actually delivered any opinion on the controversial
question,"329 the Shalit decision was venomously attacked by the Chief
Rabbi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, and the Rabbinate's chief
executive.330
As a result of the public rancor, "[t]he inevitable governmental crisis in
the wake of the Shalit case was not long in coming, and in response to the
strong protests against the decision made by the religious parties, the Law
of Return was amended." 3 1 Indeed, "[e]ven before anyone had time to
324. Id. at 121.
325. Id. at 129-31.
326. Id. at 143-45.
327. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1547.
328. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89.
329. Id. at 90.
330. LESLIE, supra note 190, at 42; ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 303.
331. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 8. See also Sapir, supra note 273, at 1243 (noting that the Shalit
decision "triggered a public storm and a threat on the National Religious Party's part to bolt the
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read the lengthy judgment . .. the religious parties lashed out against the
majority with a ferocity unparalleled in Israel's history of respect for the
judiciary."33 2  "[U]nder threat by the Orthodox to bring down the
government, the Knesset passed legislation directly addressing the Court's
decision.""' Out of necessity, the process was rapid. "[T]he new Law was
hastily prepared by the Minister of Justice and approved by the Cabinet,
presented to the Knesset, discussed, adopted and promulgated: the entire
legislative process was completed within a few weeks."334 The Shalit
decision had been handed down on January 23, 1970. By March 16, 1970,
the Amendment had been adopted. 335
The Amendment rejected the Supreme Court's secular position on the
severability of religion and nationality. 336 "It amended the Law of Return
by defining as a Jew 'a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has
become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another
religion."' 337 The Amendment also extended the right of return to a Jew's
spouse, children, grandchildren, and the spouses of children and
grandchildren, regardless of whether they were Jewish (unless they had
previously been Jewish and converted to another religion). 338 Thus, the
Amendment, "[t]hough basically following the religious concept ...
constitutes a typical compromise between the two ideologies by granting
coalition, a move that would have precipitated the government's downfall."); Edelman, supra note 26,
at 218 ("The Shalit decision created a political maelstrom and propelled a most reluctant Knesset to
act."); Shava, supra note 14, at 146 ("The judgment in Shalit's case . . . created a public storm and the
threat of a governmental crisis due to the dissatisfaction of the National Religious Party."); Klein,
supra note 115, at 60 n.23 ("The amendments were spurred by the Supreme Court's Shalit decision");
Ginossar, supra note 115 at 264 ("[F]ar from settling the issue, [the Shalit decision] exacerbated it
further, even threatening the stability of the Coalition Government."); KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54
("The Shalit decision stirred the public for days."); Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89 (noting "a loud
and heated debate swept the whole country," "[tiwo religious [government] ministers spoke out
against the decision," and "[t]he Rabbinate issued a proclamation stating that any enforcement of the
Court's ruling would be contrary to Holy Writ and ordered the Minister of Interior not to obey the
Court's decision").
332. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 89; see also ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 303.
333. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54 ("On January 25,
1970, the National Religious Party announced that it would resign from the Government Coalition
unless the Knesset passed legislation reversing the Court's decision."). In fact, the legislation
amending the Law of Return did not address the Court's decision at all. "The Law of Return was not
invoked as all the Shalits were Israeli citizens-Anne Shalit by naturalization, the father and children
by birth." Rubenstein, supra note 131 at 85. But see Shalit, supra note 283, at 103, 145 (Kister, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Anne Shalit had not been naturalized).
334. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 264. See also KRAINES, supra note 130, at 54 ("Four days later
the Cabinet voted to recommend to the Knesset the legislation demanded by the National Religious
Party."); Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 90 ("A week later, the two Shapiros-the Minister of Justice
and Minister of Interior-came out with a proposed package deal.").
335. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 264 n.3.
336. Stroman, supra note 79, at 1547 n.15 (quoting JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 71).
337. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70; Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970, 24 LSI 28
(1969-1970) (Isr.). The Population Registry Law was simultaneously amended to preclude registration
as a Jew of anyone failing the test laid down for the Law of Return. JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 70;
see also Shava, supra note 14, at 146-47; Klein, supra note 115, at 58-59.
338. Ginossar, supra note 115, at 266 & n.10.
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equal rights under the Law of Return to persons who are formally not
Jews." 3
4. Beresford
The final act in the Supreme Court's drama concerns Gary and Shirley
Beresford, a Messianic Jewish couple who sought to emigrate to Israel
from their home in South Africa.340 Beresford is notable because unlike
Rufeisen, there was no formal act of affiliation (as with Rufeisen's baptism
and subsequent holy orders) and unlike Shalit, there was no absence of
some outward manifestation of affiliation (as with Anne Shalit's decision
not to convert). Instead, Beresford concerns solely individual beliefs and
the result that particular beliefs may have on religious status under civil
law. Where Brother Daniel was deemed no longer Jewish because he
"linked his destiny to other forces whose precepts he honours in both
thought and observance,"34 1 Beresford took this one step further by
making maintenance of Jewish status turn exclusively on thought. The
case is also notable insofar as two Justices, applying two very different
modes of analysis, come to the same result. At first, this may seem
innocuous. But, again, closer inspection reveals that both rely on some of
the same suppositions, and there is good reason to believe that
suppositions, which frame both analyses, have a significant influence on
the result the Court reaches.
Gary Lee Beresford and Shirley Beresford sought oleh's visas to
immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return, either as Jews themselves or,
under the newly enacted category, as children of Jews. 3 42 That both of
them were born Jews was not in dispute.343 With respect to practice, the
Beresfords observed the Sabbath and Jewish dietary laws, were Zionists,
and held strong emotional ties with the people, state, and land of Israel.3"
But the couple also belonged to the "Jews for Jesus" movement. Although
339. Englard, supra note 7, at 194-95. At the time, Israel was preparing for the possibility of
massive immigration from the Soviet Union due to the Jewish "national awakening" that country had
recently experienced. Weiss, supra note 115, at 94. Many in Israel understood that given the realities
of life in the U.S.S.R., they could expect a significant number of Jews with non-Jewish spouses, and
there was a call from some quarters to ease the process of immigration for these couples. Id. At the
same time as the National Religious Party had acquiesced to broadening the Law of Return to include
non-Jewish family members, there was significant pressure to define who was a Jew for Law of Return
and registration purposes along religious lines. Id
340. HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of the Interior 43(4) PD 793 [1987] (Isr.), translated in
JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XI: LAW, JUDICIAL POLICY, AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE STATE
OF ISRAEL 27-63 (Daniel B. Sinclair ed., 2000) [hereinafter Beresford].
341. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.) (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 28. For a more colorful, if unflaggingly sympathetic, background to the Beresfords'
case, see LINDA ALEXANDER, THE UNPROMISED LAND: THE STRUGGLE OF MESSIANIC JEWS GARY &
SHIRLEY BERESFORD (1994).
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not Christians-neither had ever been baptized-the Beresfords "came to
believe that there is no contradiction between the Jewish faith and the
belief in Jesus as the Messiah; this belief, according to their view, is an
inseparable part of a clearly Jewish religious movement, which
characterized a legitimate stream of Judaism in the Second Temple
period" and which they contended was "a legitimate stream of Judaism
today."3 45
The question before the Court was whether this belief alone, in the
absence of baptism and affiliation with any Christian church, rendered the
Beresfords "members of another religion" such that they had extinguished
their rights, as Jews, to make aliyah under the Law of Return. Justice Elon
stressed that formal admission to another religion under its own terms is
not required for purposes of the Law of Return (though it would be with
respect to matters of personal status adjudicated by the religious courts). 34 6
Instead, with respect to the Law of Return, "all that we need ask of the
other religion is whether such beliefs are amongst the principles which
express the substance and the character of that religion."34 7 Notably, Elon
held that what counts is not ceremonial admission, but "theological
criteria, i.e. what are the central doctrinal or theological principles through
which that other religion finds expression."3 48 Applying this test, Elon
concluded that "the most important thing-even more important than
baptism- . . . in Christianity-is the belief in the Divinity of Jesus." 349
Elon continued by refuting the Beresfords' claim that Jews for Jesus
should be counted among the various branches of Judaism because "[iun
the entire world of Jews and Judaism, in all its movements and divisions,
there is not a single community which believes in the divinity of a human
being in the incarnation of God, and in a Messiah that has already
arrived." 3"o Elon held that "Notwithstanding any historical claim that
Messianic Jews were once fully accepted as members of the Jewish
religion, the situation has changed irreversibly and no person believing in
Jesus can claim today to be a Jew under this objective definition."3 5 1
Breaking somewhat with past cases that went to lengths to distance the
Court from application of halakha, Elon also turned to several religious
345. Id. at 28-29.
346. Id at 29-30.
347. Id. at 30.
348. Id. at 30.
349. Id. at 30.
350. Id at 32. Of course, this reasoning is deeply flawed; it defines-out Messianic Jews. Any
denomination could be similarly excluded by essentializing a particular characteristic or lack of a
particular characteristic. For example, if one wanted to define Judaism in theological terms, one could
create a definition that "... there is not a single community that does not profess a belief in a
supernatural God." Such a definition would exclude Humanistic Judaism. Other examples could be
drawn up along similar lines, simply by identifying a particular characteristic and declaring it to be
either essential or disqualifying.
351. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 9.
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authorities to conclude that even under religious law, an apostate is
considered a Jew only for purposes of marriage and divorce. 352
Justice Barak agreed that the petition must be dismissed, but on rather
different grounds. He reasoned that the definition of Judaism for the Law
of Return is a dynamic, secular, liberal one, established on the basis of
public opinion at any given time.35 3 He noted that the question before the
Court was only the meaning of the phrase "and is not a member of another
religion."354 Barak rejected an earlier approach that assessed whether an
individual is a member of another religion by reference to the position of
the other religion, because it is "incompatible with the aim underlying the
definition of 'Jew' in the Law of Return" which was "intended to establish
the identities of those who are entitled to immigration to Israel" and
therefore Jewishness cannot be made contingent upon the particularities of
a non-Jewish community.355 Secondly, applying another religion's
membership criteria, although it serves the purpose of permitting relative
autonomy of religious groups to direct their own affairs in the matters that
have been delegated to them, does not serve any parallel purpose in the
context of the Law of Return.35" Barak rejects determining who is a
member of another religion according to any religious law, including
Jewish law, not least because the Amendment was generally thought
inconsistent with halakha.357 He concedes that the Law of Return is
animated by Jewish religious conceptions of Jewry as a body corporate,
but concludes that this cannot mean that the Jewish religious conception of
"another religion" is what the Knesset intended to adopt.35
Instead, Barak held that it must be understood in the context of secular
Israeli law.359 He explained that "[t]he expression 'is not a member of
another religion' is like any other expression in the Law of Return, which
must be accorded a secular interpretation." 360 Relying on the opinions of
Justices Silberg, Cohn, Landau, and Berinson in Rufeisen, he noted that
the interpretation that governs is the common understanding. 361 This
understanding, he continued, "undoubtedly contains religious elements,
for these elements currently constitute a component in the identity of the
Jewish people." 362 But ultimately, it is a criterion of "national-secular and
352. Beresford, supra note 340, at 32-35.
353. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 9.
354. Beresford, supra note 340, at 46.
355. Id. at 47.
356. Id. at 48-49.
357. Id. at 49-51.
358. Id. at 51-52.
359. Id at 53.
360. Id
361. Id
362. Id. at 55.
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not religious significance."363
Barak concluded that the national-secular definition of the Jewish
people excluded those who have a religion other than Judaism that is
"their effective religion" to which they "see themselves connected in their
every-day lives.""3M Notably, he explained, "it is essential that this
effective connection be incompatible with the secular conception of a
person being a Jew," and offered Brother Daniel as a prime example. 365 "A
person who was born of a Jewish mother but has become a Christian priest
is 'a member of another religion' since, according to our secular approach,
he has stopped being a Jew."
Applying this national-secular concept of "Jew" to the case at hand,
Barak noted that the Beresfords were not part of the Jewish community in
Johannesburg and that they believed in Jesus as the son of God, the
Messiah, and the King of the Jews. He also noted, however, that they do
not believe in the doctrine of the Trinity and have not been baptized, and
that they have a profound connection with the Jewish people. 36 7
Conceding that the followers of Jesus in the first century may have seen
no contradiction in that pursuit with membership in the Jewish
community, Barak concluded that the Jew "from the marketplace" today
would take the Beresfords as members of another religion because "it is
not possible to skip two thousand years of history as if nothing
happened."368 "According to the secular criterion, the other religion-the
one to which the Petitioners belong-is Christianity," even if Christians
would not view things that way according to Christian doctrine.369 The
controlling factor is the current secular conception of what it means to be a
member of another religion, not whether the petitioners are apostates
under Jewish law, or whether they have been formally accepted into
another religion according to the norms of the other religion.370 Justice
Halima concurred in the result without opinion. 37 1
B. The Court's Conclusions
Rufeisen, Shalit, and Beresford raise a number of intriguing points
concerning how the Supreme Court of Israel understands what it means as
a legal matter to be a Jew and, in turn, what constitutes a "religion" and a
363. Id.
364. Id. at 56.
365. Id
366. Id
367. Id at 59-60.
368. Id. at 60.
369. Id. at 61-62.
370. Id. at 62. Justice Barak noted briefly that the same reasoning applied with equal force to the
phrase "voluntarily changed his religion" in section 4A, and the Beresfords were therefore not entitled
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"nationality." First, a strong majority of the Court in Rufeisen rejected the
notion that who is a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return should be
determined according to halakha.37 2 Instead, Rufeisen referred to the
popular understanding of religion to make that determination. Popular
understanding, in turn, "treated conversion as decisive."37 4 Rufeisen had
placed himself outside of the Jewish community "in both thought and
observance. "3  Shalit held that nationality is subjective (or at least mostly
subjective) but to reach that conclusion had to assume that religion and
nationality are separable categories. 7 And finally Beresford took
Rufeisen one step further, holding that religion is primarily a matter of
belief and closing the door on the possibility raised in Rufeisen that formal
affiliation is necessary. 377 In Rufeisen, Berinson suggested that had
Rufeisen become a Buddhist, rather than a Christian monk, he would not
have extinguished his right of return.7 After Beresford, that possibility
appears to be foreclosed.
In short, for the Supreme Court of Israel, religion is 1) something
separable from nationality and 2) primarily a matter of belief. These
conclusions, although not inevitable, were also not unprecedented in
Israeli history. For example, a minister of the Jewish Agency said that not
joining another religion is a requirement of Jewish status for aliyah.379
This conclusion may have been based on a statement Herzl made that a
Jew who converted to another religion was not a Jew and was not entitled
to membership in the Zionist Organization. 380
In reaching these conclusions, the Court understood itself to be applying
an "ordinary" or "secular" understanding of "religion" and
"nationality." Oswald Rufeisen himself admitted, "had my position
been accepted this would have created a revolution in conventional
concepts."382 But how did these concepts come to be considered
372. Sinclair, supra note 12, at 5.
373. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 15; LESLIE, supra note 190, at 39; JACOBSON, supra note 78, at
65 (noting that for the majority, "the secular meaning of the term 'Jew' in the Law of Return is to be
derived from the common understanding of the 'ordinary simple Jew."'); Green, supra note 200, at
191.
374. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 88.
375. See Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23 (opinion of Landau, J.).
376. See supra notes 277, 287-88, 295, 300, and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 367-70 and accompanying text. See also Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 23
(opinion of Landau, J.) (noting importance of both "thought" and "observance").
378. Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 31 (opinion of Berinson, J.).
379. TEC, supra note 160, at 226.
380. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 109.
381. Slovenko, supra note 118, at 16-17 ("[T]he Court in the Brother Daniel case looked to the
ordinary meaning of the term 'Jews.' Justice Silberg made reference to the 'ordinary every meaning'
of the word as used by Jews; Justice Landau spoke of the 'instinct of the overwhelming majority of
Jews today' . . . and Justice Berenson, of the 'common meaning of the word' and of the 'popular
understanding."'); Galanter, supra note 157, at 11 (same).
382. TEC, supra note 160, at 231.
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"ordinary" and "conventional"-so ubiquitous and fundamental as to be
unworthy of critical inquiry, and so widely accepted as to be
presumptively neutral?
The answer appears to be two-fold. First, "religion" is generally
understood to mean something chiefly concerned with beliefs because
Christianity is chiefly concerned with beliefs. "Religion" historically
connoted those non-Western modes of behavior, rituals, institutions, etc.
that had at least rough parallels in Christianity. "Religion" is, at its core, a
Christian category. But as the centrality of religion generally and
Christianity specifically declined in the West, the idea of religion as an
isolable component of the human experience lost the connection to its
Christian origins. Eventually, the Christian idea of "religion" was adopted
by non-Christians. Religion was reified as a legal construct in
constitutions and laws guaranteeing "freedom of religion." And as religion
became a universal concept, there seemed little reason to question its
provenance or its neutrality as a category.
V. A CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION
The approach the Supreme Court of Israel has taken to defining who is a
Jew under civil law is not secular, but is instead derived from the history
of Christian hegemony in the West.383 It is not a neutral definition, but
rather a sacrifice-intentional or not-of a Jewish corporate self-
conception at the altar of Christian universalism.
A. A "Rather Odd Modern Concept "384
In colloquial speech, "religion" is "one of the simplest, most obvious
and minimal terminological statements" one can make.38 ' As understood
by the Court, the concept is essentially "transhistorical and
transcultural,"386 i.e., unhistoricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed
immune to or inherently resistant to critical analysis."3 87 Even today, the
category "'world religions" belies a pervasive, unexamined, and "rather
monumental assumption . .. that religion is a universal, or at least
ubiquitous phenomenon to be found anywhere in the world at any time in
history."'
But despite its ubiquity, "[t]he modern concept of religion . . . is not a
383. See DIDI HERMAN, AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS, & ENGLISH LAW
16 (2011) ("[Slecularism becomes a term that facilitates judicial Christian thinking").
384. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13, 190.
385. Dan, supra note 1, at xxv.
386. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 28 (1993).
387. TOMOKO MASUZAWA, THE INVENTION OF WORLD RELIGIONS 1-2 (2005).
388. Id. at 1.
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neutral or timeless category but instead a modem, European creation, and
a Protestant one at that."389 Leora Batnitzky explains "this Protestant
notion simply as the view that religion denotes a sphere of life separate
and distinct from all others, and that this sphere is largely private and not
public, voluntary and not compulsory." 390 An understanding of religion
that gives primacy to propositional belief (which occupies the private,
voluntary sphere) has been called "a modern, privatized Christian one
because and to the extent that it emphasizes the priority of belief as a state
of mind rather than as constituting activity in the world." 391 In short, the
common understanding of "religion," as primarily a matter of voluntary,
internal, propositional belief is neither neutral nor secular.392 It assumes
and is built on a Christian normativity.
The extent to which "religion" is a product of post-Enlightenment
Protestantism or of the early Christian period is not well understood.393
But the idea of religion, as it "is generally recognized, derive[s] from
Western cultural traditions and experiences." 394 Ruth Langer and Joseph
Dan agree "that the very concepts of religion and theology as the academy
understands them today are Christian concepts, derived from
Christianity's early accommodations with Greco-Roman culture, resulting
389. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1, 13, 190; see also Linda Woodhead, Five Concepts of
Religion, 21 INT'L REV. Soc.-REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 121, 123 (2011) ("[T]he
conception of religion as a matter of belief is a distinctly modern one, with a bias toward modem
Christian, especially Protestant, forms of religion."); Hent de Vries, Introduction: Why Still
"Religion "?, in RELIGION: BEYOND A CONCEPT 1, 4 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) (Religion points to
"many concepts, in any event, the ones we have come to associate with it too quickly, influenced by a
Western and especially Protestant idiom."); James Boyd White, Talking About Religion in the
Language of the Law, in JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND LEGAL EDUCATION 124, 131 (1999) ("Here is the image of religion (I think deeply Protestant in
nature) to which I have been repeatedly exposed. Religion at heart consists in something called
'belief; this belief is arrived at by an individual, in whatever way seems best to him or her; the object
of this belief is a set of propositions, usually about a Supreme Being, sometimes about a set of beings
superior to the human; this being (or beings) issues commands to human beings, who are threatened
with punishment, often eternal punishment, if they fail to comply; and the life of religion consists in
large part of obedience to these commands.").
390. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13.
391. Charles Taylor, The Future of the Religious Past, in RELIGION: BEYOND A CONCEPT 178,
178-79 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) ("One of the main vectors over the last six or seven centuries in this
civilization has been a steadily increasing emphasis on a religion of personal commitment and
devotion, over against forms centered on collective ritual."); ASAD, supra note 386, at 47.
392. See generally Petty, supra note 6, at 135-42 (discussing origin and development of the
concept of religion).
393. DANIEL BOYARIN, BORDER LINES: THE PARTITION OF JUDAEO-CHRISTIANITY 11 (2004).
394. Benson Saler, Religio and the Definition of Religion, 2 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 395,
395 (1987). See also Jan G. Platvoet, Contexts, Concepts and Contests: Toward a Pragmatics of
Defining Religion, in THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION: CONTEXTS, CONCEPTS AND
CONTESTS 463, 463-64 (Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk eds., 1999) ("[T]he modem terms
'religion' and 'religions' are diffuse and untidy prototypical concepts of recent Western origin.");
Russell T. McCutcheon, The Category "Religion" in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey, 42
NUMEN 284, 285-86 (1995) (citing Tim Murphy, Wesen under Erscheiung in the History of the Study
of Religion: A Post-Structuralist Perspective, 6 METHOD & THEORY IN THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS 119,
119-46 (1994) ("universalized categories as 'religion'-defined as essence or manifestation, are part
of the baggage of Occidental Humanism.")).
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in a clear differentiation between the realms of church and state and
between theology and philosophy."395 In the Roman context, "religio"
denoted that aspect of human life which is dedicated to the worship of the
gods; a corner of the week's activities and a few days of festivals."3 96
The Protestant Reformation redefined religio to correspond to
individual beliefs.397 In contrast to their perception of Roman Catholic
practice wherein the individual's relationship with God was mediated by
priests performing sacraments and rites, Protestants sought a more direct
relationship between the individual and God.3 98 Thus, many of the
"position[s] and functions formerly controlled by the church came to be
transferred to the individual and his or her conscience." 39 9
During the Enlightenment the construct of "religion"-as a category
broader than Christianity alone-was "forged into a recognizably modem
form,"400 which "drew heavily upon prior Christian understandings."40'
Indeed, it was not until Enlightenment that the term "Christianity"
becomes standard and increasingly comes to refer to "a system of
beliefs." 402 And "[b]y the eighteenth century, religion did not refer mainly
395. Langer, supra note 141, at 257; see also Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi ("Christianity did
describe itself as a religion. It accepted this term from the Hellenistic world, especially from Roman
ways of worship.").
396. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi; see also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 6 ("The modem concept
of religion also indicates that religion is one particular dimension of life among other particular and
separate dimensions, such as politics, morality, science, or economics.").
397. See Robert A. Yelle, Moses' Veil: Secularization as a Christian Myth, in AFTER SECULAR
LAW 23, 34 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011) ("The triumph of an antinomian concept of
religion ... was ... largely a product of the Reformation."); Woodhead, supra note 389, at 123 ("The
'confessionalization' of religion in the post-Reformation period tended to define and distinguish
different forms of religion (particularly Christianity) in terms of distinctive 'confessions' of faith.");
Carolyn Evans, Introduction, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1, 8
(Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008) ("This is a particularly post-Reformation Western view of religion that
gives primacy to the internal, intellectual aspects of religion over other viewpoints"); Taylor, supra
note 391, at 179 ("The point of declaring that salvation comes through faith was radically to devalue
ritual and external practice in favor of inward adherence."); de Vries, supra note 389, at 5 (discussing
". . . the modem definition of the concept, which has so often, and all too hastily, identified 'religion'
with a 'set of beliefs."').
398. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA
23-24 (1985).
399. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1869, 1877 (2009); see also Molendijk, supra note 5, at 5 ("Does the notion [of 'religion'] not
preserve a one-sided-Schleiermachian-focus on the inner religious sentiment as well? The alleged
eurocentricity, especially, makes Western scholars feel uneasy.").
400. Saler, supra note 394, at 395. See also PETER HARRISON, 'RELIGION' AND THE RELIGIONS IN
THE ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT 1 (1990) ("The concepts 'religion' and 'the religions' ... emerged
quite late in Western thought, during the Enlightenment."); ASAD, supra note 386, at 45 (noting the
modem view of religion as that which consists of "a positive attitude toward the problem of disorder,
of affirming simply that in some sense or other the world as a whole is explicable, justifiable,
bearable ... is a product of the only legitimate space allowed to Christianity by post-Enlightenment
society, the right to individual belief').
401. Michael L. Satlow, Defining Judaism: Accounting for Religions in the Study ofReligion, 74
J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 837, 841 (2006).
402. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 70-71 (1964).
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to ritual practice or performance, but instead to personal belief or faith."403
The equation of religion with faith, therefore, "involves the reproduction
of a Christian worldview." 404 Among scholars of religion, "[i]t has become
a truism that religion in its modem sense is an invention of Christians."405
As James Boyd White sardonically noted, "'religious belief means the
affirmation of certain propositions. What else could it be?"406 Certainly for
the Supreme Court of Israel, the affirmation of Christian articles of faith
has often been determinative.
B. Christianity is a Religion. Judaism "Refuses to be One. "407
The tension between Judaism and the common notion of religion is "one
of the most vexed problems of modernity."4 At least until very recent
times, Judaism did not fit with the internal, private, voluntary Protestant
conception of religion.409 "Adherence to religious law, which is at least
partially, if not largely, public in nature, does not seem to fit into the
category of faith or belief, which by definition is individual and
private." 410 In Judaism, actions matter most. As Moses Mendelssohn
explained, "Among all the prescriptions and ordinances of the Mosaic law,
there is not a single one which says: You shall believe or not believe. They
all say: You shall do or not do."4 11 As Mendelssohn elaborated, "Jewish
religion is not a matter of belief but rather of behavior. As he puts it,
'Judaism knows of no revealed religion in the sense in which Christians
understand the term. The Israelites possess divine legislation-laws,
commandments, ordinances, rules of life, instruction in the will of God as
to how they should conduct themselves in order to attain temporal and
eternal felicity."' 412 Indeed, plurality of belief and of observance have
been identifiable features of the Jewish experience since at least the
403. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1; see also GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND
ANTISEMITISM 70 (1990) (By the eighteenth century, after the Roman Catholic monopoly on European
Christianity failed, the term "religion" "came to be applied to the beliefs of the competing religious
societies into which Europe had been fragmented.").
404. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1.
405. Id. at 11. As early as the 1960s sociologists began to recognize that the conceptions of
religion holding sway in academic studies were heavily influenced by the investigators' own Christian
milieu. See Woodhead, supra note 389, at 121 ("Thomas Luckmann (1967) argued that sociological
studies of religion hugged the form of churches so closely that they rendered other manifestations of
religion 'invisible.').
406. White, supra note 389, at 133.
407. Id. at 8, 12.
408. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 13, 190. See also id. at I ("From the eighteenth century
onward, modem Jewish thinkers have been concerned with the question of whether or not Judaism can
fit into a modern, Protestant category of religion.").
409. Victoria S. Harrison, The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural World, 59
INT'L J. PHIL. RELIGION 133, 134 (2006) ("[R]eligion cannot so easily be identified with the
affirmation of a given content of belief.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1.
411. Id. at 27.
412. Id. at 20.
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destruction of the Second Temple.4 1 3
Conversely, "Judaism is not and has not been, since early in the
Christian era, a 'religion' in the sense of an orthodoxy whereby heterodox
views, even very strange opinions, would make one an outsider."414 Belief
matters little. Indeed, Amos Funkenstein suggests that "no written or oral
commandment forbids an orthodox Jew even now to believe in the
messianity of Christ." 4 15 And "[flor most Jews, religious observance is a
means of identifying with the Jewish community, rather than an
expression of religious faith."4 16 As a result, notions of Judaism "as a faith
that can be separated from ethnicity, nationality, language, and shared
history have felt false."417
Beyond the focus on actions rather than belief, Judaism did not
understand itself to be a "religion" in the Greco-Roman sense adopted by
Christianity: "a comer of the week's activities and a few days of
festivals."418 Instead, Judaism saw itself "expressing the totality of the
meaning and purpose of every single aspect of human activities." 419 As
Hirsch explained, "Judaism is not a religion . . . . Judaism is not a mere
adjunct to life: it comprises all of life."420
"'Religion' and its cognate terms seem self-evidently meaningful
because they are so deeply embedded and widely used in everyday
language. But their meaning is loose and largely influenced by
traditional-and conflicting-religious preconceptions."4 2' For this
reason, "[i]f historians categorize Judaism and Christianity as instances of
413. Hayim Lapin, The Origins and Development ofthe Rabbinic Movement in the Land ofIsrael,
in THE LATE ROMAN-RABBINIC PERIOD 214 (Steven T. Katz ed., 2006).
414. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 13.
415. AMos FUNKENSTEIN, PERCEPTIONS OF JEWISH HISTORY 170 (1993).
416. Zvi Gitelman, The Decline of the Diaspora Jewish Nation: Boundaries, Content, and Jewish
Identity, 2 JEWISH SOC. STUD. 112, 119 (1998) (internal quotation omitted); see also Andrew Buckser,
Secularization, Religiosity, and the Anthropology of Jewry, 10 J. MODERN JEWISH STUD. 205, 208
(2011) ("[G]roup identity and membership are intimately linked to religious practice.").
417. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 8; see also Buckser, supra note 416, at 208 ("In Judaism ...
ritual has a religious value of its own, one substantially independent of the particular theological
meanings attached to it.").
418. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi; see also BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 6 ("The modem concept
of religion also indicates that religion is one particular dimension of life among other particular and
separate dimensions, such as politics, morality, science, or economics.").
419. Dan, supra note 1, at xxvi. On the other hand, "in the last two centuries a large segment of
the Jewish people moved from one understanding of the meaning of 'religion' to another." Id. at
xxviii. And today, virtually "[a]ll contemporary Jewish religious denominations .. . [have] adopted the
Christian concept of religion as an individual spiritual realm which constitutes a part of human life,
besides which other profane aspects of life and culture can co-exist." Id. In fact, Orthodox Judaism
may have adopted the Protestant model the most fully. See BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 43 ("[T]he
historical irony is that Hirsch's orthodoxy is not only modem, but rather in a certain sense the most
modem of modem Judaisms in molding itself as a religion on the German Protestant model."). See
also Woodhead, supra note 389, at 124 (noting that "a 'beliefification' of religion is also evident in
other [non-Christian] world religions in modem times").
420. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 41.
421. LANGMUIR, supro note 403, at 6.
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the same kind of basic human activity, as 'religion,' despite the obvious
differences in the beliefs and actions of Jews and Christians, they should
recognize that they themselves are deciding what they mean by
religion." 422 Daniel Boyarin, for example, suggests that the categorization
of Judaism as a religion is wholly artificial when he says "it is not the case
that Christianity and Judaism are two separate and different religions, but
that they are two different kinds of things altogether. "423
C. A Supreme Irony?
At first blush it seems that the Supreme Court of Israel's apparently
unwitting importation of Christian norms into Israeli jurisprudence is
enormously ironic (particularly given some of the venomous language in
Rufeisen and Beresford about how awful Christians have been to Jews
over the years). The more the Court attempted to distance itself from
halakhic rules in favor of what it understood to be "secular" concepts, the
more it stumbled into Christian norms concerning religion and even
Judaism. But the Court's apparent lack of interest in critically examining
the concepts applied is perhaps not entirely unjustified. In other words, the
adoption of Christian norms may have served some useful purpose
notwithstanding the Court's lack of critical analysis of the category itself.
1. Forging an Identity
"The new Jewish culture which developed in Eretz Israel in the first half
of the twentieth century was modern, Western and secular."424 The young
state, including the Supreme Court, had a mandate to reflect that culture.
Thus, in Rufeisen, all of the Justices expressed a view that halakhic rulings
would not control the outcome.425 The Court went to pains to show that
Israel was not a theocratic state, and that the civil courts would not defer
to rabbinic rulings on matters of civil law (even where civil law imported
what might be religious concepts or terminology). Israel wanted to show it
was modern and enlightened, more European than Levantine, and that
meant a civil legal system separate from and superior to religious
tribunals.
Beyond this urgency to cabin any potential criticism that Israel would
422. Id. at 46. Even so, this is still how religion is generally understood, even in the academy. See
Evans, supra note 397, at 8 (noting that "[f]or most of the authors [in an edited volume], religion is
primarily a set of beliefs-beliefs that are capable of being adopted, rejected, modified or refined at
the will of the believer"); Woodhead, supra note 389, at 123 ("One of the most popular conceptions of
religion today-if one takes as evidence not only academic work but the discourse of politicians, legal
professionals, journalists, and everyday talk-is of religion as belief. On this account, being religious
has to do with believing certain things, where that amounts to subscribing to certain propositions and
accepting certain doctrines.").
423. BOYARIN, supra note 393, at 13.
424. MAUTNER, supra note 20, at 29.
425. See JACOBSON, supra note 78, at 64.
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become a Jewish theocracy, there was at the same time a struggle to forge
a national identity. During the 1950s,
significant efforts were invested in the creation of national symbols
and a national identity: "The creation of Israel and the tripling of
its population in three years led state leaders to feel that the
country must be completely integrated; that the value-belief
systems separating the various camps must be abolished and
replaced by a unified symbol system uniting the entire Jewish
population in support of the state and its institutions."42 6
"This ideology . .. in many respects . .. acquired the role of a civil
religion for Israel."427 Even apart from matters of security, the Court
clearly had more pressing concerns than the historical nuances of widely
shared concepts.
2. The Relationship Between Nation-State and Religion
Moreover, at the same time that Israel was trying to define itself as a
state, it also had the task of defining the state's relationship with religion.
This posed a unique challenge. European nations defined religion in
Christian terms (and their former colonies had it so defined for them). This
meant that in Europe, religion was not just internal, individual, private,
voluntary, and separable from other categories of existence (as
Christianity is) but also that Christians, as a community, did not constitute
a political entity. Indeed, the idea of religion as it is understood in modern
states assumes a lack of political control. In the modern state, "citizenship
meant the subordination of any communal identity to the state and the
relegation of religion to the sphere of private sentiment." 428 This
distribution of power-with the nation-state governing external actions
and serving as a locus for communal identity, while religion governs
internal beliefs and is primarily concerned with the individual-fits
comfortably when the religion in question was Christianity.
For Jews living in Europe, the separation of religion from temporal
authority posed a problem because the pre-emancipation Jewish
communities were to a significant extent self-governing. They did hold
political power over their members, and they claimed primary importance
in constituting their members' identities.429 "The whole concept of Jewish
426. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 36 (quoting CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHHIYA,
CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL: TRADITIONAL JUDAISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE JEWISH STATE 82
(1983)).
427. Id. The Israeli national identity is thus "inspired by religious history but detached from
religion as such." Id. at 37. And today, there is "a growing detachment among the Israeli secular public
from traditions that had previously also been respected by non-religious Jews, together with a
declining willingness to view religious elements of the culture as having national significance." Id. at
3.
428. Id. at 33.
429. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 98-99 ("The political framework of the corporate medieval
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identity, in its traditional sense, is founded upon the Covenant (Brit)
between God and the Jewish people. . . . It is this Covenant which . . .
because of its continuity, defines a Jew independently of his own personal
belief."43 0
"[B]efore Jews received the rights of citizenship, Judaism was not a
religion, and Jewishness was not a matter of culture or nationality. Rather,
Judaism and Jewishness were all of these at once: religion, culture and
nationality."431 Graetz explained that
Judaism is not a religion of the individual but of the community.
That actually means that Judaism, in the strict sense of the word, is
not even a religion-if one understands thereby the relationship of
a man to his creator and his hopes for earthly existence-but rather
a constitution for a body politic.432
In order to secure the place of Jews in the modem nation-state, Judaism
surrendered much of its political authority.433 "Jewish modernity most
simply defined represents the dissolution of the political agency of the
corporate Jewish community and the concurrent shift of political agency to
the individual Jew who also became a citizen of the modem nation-
state."434 The emancipation of individuals came at the cost of collective
political autonomy. "It "meant that Jews were free as individuals, but that
Jewishness and even a full embrace of Judaism could not be freely
expressed within German culture. The notions of being German and
citizenship in the modem state excluded the possibility of other types of
state allowed for the Jewish enclave to be in the state but not of the state. The disciplined Jewish
community lived largely by its own law, which the rabbis, through their interpretations, applied to
concrete situations in changing circumstances."); Salo Baron, Ghetto and Emancipation: Shall We
Revise the Traditional View?, XIV THE MENORAH J. 515, 519 (1928) ("Like other corporations, the
Jewish community enjoyed full internal autonomy.... Thus the Jewish community of pre-
revolutionary days had more competence over its members than the modem Federal, State, and
Municipal governments combined.").
430. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85.
431. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 186. See also Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85 ("Judaism
does not conform to the ordinary rules of nations and religions"); BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 1-2
("To appreciate the novelty of the idea of Jewish religion, we need to understand a bit about the nature
and structure of medieval and early modem Jewish communities. Prior to modernity [emancipation]
Judaism was not a religion, and Jewishness was not a matter of culture or nationality. Rather, Judaism
and Jewishness were all these at once: religion, culture, and nationality.").
432. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 45. See also id. at 46 ("Granting Judaism a political dimension
means, as Graetz indicates, that Judaism does not quite fit the category of religion."); Dan, supra note
1, at xxviii ("The use of the term 'religion' in a Jewish context is, therefore, an external imposition
rather than an authentic expression of the intrinsic nature of Judaism."). But see BATNITSKY, supra
note 22, at 43 (discussing Hirsch's creation of Jewish orthodoxy in the German Protestant model).
433. ABRAMOV, supra note 13, at 98-99 ("The French Revolution and the Emancipation brought
about the disintegration of Jewish autonomous life in Europe."); Baron, supra note 429, at 524
("When the modem State came into being and set out to destroy the medieval corporations and estates
to build a new citizenship, it could no longer suffer the existence of an autonomous Jewish
corporation.").
434. BATNITSKY, supra note 22, at 4; see also id at 92 ("Mendelssohn ... invented the idea that
Judaism is a religion in order to make room for the emergence of the modern nation-state.").
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collective belonging." 4 3 5 Thus, the French politician Comte de Clermont-
Tonnerre claimed that "[o]ne must refuse everything to the Jews as a
nation, but one must give them everything as individuals; they must
become citizens."436
The nascent Israeli state had the arduous task of reconciling a dominant
non-Christian religion with its existence as a nation state. Being a modem
nation-state required "religion" to occupy a private, internal space
subordinate to the state and with little, if any, temporal political power.
Anything less would risk charges of theocracy. A move toward an
understanding of Judaism as a religion in the sense that religion is
understood in Christian states avoided that difficulty.
3. Zionism as Normalization
Finally, the influence of Zionism must be considered. If the raison
d'tre of Zionism is to normalize the situation of the Jews,437 then perhaps
it makes sense that Israel should understand religion in Christian terms
independently of the state's desire to minimize religious authorities'
influence over the affairs of state. Normalization means to be a nation
among the other nations of the world,438 and if the international
community generally views religion in one (Protestant) way, then why not
assume that viewpoint if it furthers that goal of Zionism? On the other
hand, if the point of Zionism is to allow Jews full political participation
with full Jewish experience, it is difficult to see how a full Jewish
experience is possible where religion is not understood by the nominally
Jewish state on Jewish terms.
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING SECULARIZATION
So far, I have suggested that the understanding of "religion" employed
by the Supreme Court of Israel is one premised primarily, if not
exclusively, on belief, and that this understanding is moored in Christian
theology. I have also explained why this might be so, and tentatively
explored the extent to which the highest court in the "Jewish state" might
have adopted, even if unwittingly, Christian normativity in its conception
435. Id. at 49; see also id. at 111 ("[1]f Judaism is a religion, it is something different in kind from
the supreme political authority of the sovereign state."); Baron, supra note 429, at 524 ("Political
equality also meant the dissolution of the autonomous communal organization: the Jews were no
longer to be a nation within a nation; they were to be thought of and to think of themselves as
individuals connected only by ties of creed-Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen of the Jewish
'Confession."').
436. Id. at 33.
437. Rubenstein, supra note 131, at 85 ("Zionism sought to solve the Jewish problem by
'normalising' the Jews.").
438. Id. ("In a sense, political Zionism attempted to do on a national basis what Jews sought in
vain to do individually, i.e. to be like all the other Goyim.").
262 [Vol. 26:211
52
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol26/iss2/2
2014]
of "religion." In this final part, I will attempt to place these findings in the
larger context of the debate over secularization.
A. The Secularization Debate
Like "religion," the notion of "'[t]he secular' was, in fact, originally a
religious concept, a product of traditional religious epistemological
frameworks." 4 39 The word "finds its original meaning in a Christian
context. Saeculum, the ordinary Latin word for century, or age, took on a
special meaning as applied to profane time, the time of ordinary historical
succession which the human race lives through between the Fall and the
Parousia."4
The noun "secularization" is likewise a Christian and specifically
Protestant construction." This usage originated in France where it
signified, in the second half of the sixteenth century (during the
Reformation), "the transfer of goods from the possession of the Church
into that of the world."442 It was brought into German no later than 1646,
and gained wide acceptance quickly in connection with the closure of
monasteries and liquidation of goods of the Roman Catholic Church."
"The notion of secularization has a long history in the social sciences,
tracing back at least to Auguste Comte's argument that a rational modem
society would render religion obsolete."" "Weber and Durkheim both
forecast the marginalization of religion in modem societies, and their
successors built the decline of religion into their models of social
439. Nomi Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED 29, 30 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 2007).
440. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 31-32 (Rhajeev
Bhargava ed., 1998). The Parousia is "the Second Coming of Christ that would precede the Last
Judgment." Jakob de Roover, Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion, in AFTER SECULAR LAW
43, 46 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).
441. See generally Yelle, supra note 397; see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Theses on
Secularism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1057 (2010) ("[T]he idea of a realm of the secular, split off
from a spiritual realm, was originally a religious idea, derived from the premises of religious-in
particular, Christian-theology."); Taylor, supra note 440, at 31 ("'Secular' itself is a Christian term . .
. ."); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept ofReligion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 813 (1997) ("Even within
Christianity, the dualistic connotation of 'religion' as standing in opposition to the 'secular' (that is,
nonreligious) is rooted in a very Protestant understanding of a world divided into Luther's Two
Kingdoms.").
442. Jan N. Bremmer, Secularization: Notes Toward a Genealogy, in RELIGION: BEYOND A
CONCEPT 432, 433 (Hent de Vries ed., 2008) (internal quotation omitted); Kevin M. Schultz,
Secularization: A Bibliographic Essay, THE HEDGEHOG REVIEW, Spring & Summer 2006, at 170, 172.
443. Bremmer, supra note 442, at 433-34. But apparently saecularisatio was not the term used in
canon law prior to this date, instead using profanatio or alienatiolalienare to mean transfer to lay
persons, and saecularisatio to refer to transfer from religious orders to secular clergy. Veit Bader,
Religion and the Myths of Secularization and Separation, RELIGARE WORKING PAPER NO. 8, 2011,
at 8.
444. Buckser, supra note 416, at 206. See also Philip S. Gorski & Ate§ Altmordu, After
Secularization?, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 55, 56 (2008); Jeffrey K. Hadden, Toward Desacralizing
Secularization Theory, 65 Soc. FORCES 587, 587, 590-91 (1987).
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moderization."445 But not until "about 1963, when two Central
Europeans, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, started publishing
studies regarding secularization, did the term receive more or less its
modern meaning."" 6
"The secularization thesis, advocated by seminal social thinkers in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, asserted that religion would gradually
fade in importance and even cease to be significant with the advent of
modem society."" The traditional formulation of secularization, the
phenomenon, holds that "'the political ends of citizens, organizations, and
societies themselves are no longer as explicitly religious as they once were
or are no longer explicitly religious at all.'" 8
Today, "there seems to be a nearly universal consensus that the so-
called 'secularization thesis' has failed."" 9 The theory, which previously
had been closer to a mathematical postulate, 4 50 began to deteriorate in
response to events such as the Iranian revolution and the rise of the
Christian right in the United States.45 1 In short, "[c]ontinued religiousity
became a nagging problem."452 And ". . . by the 1990s, [when] it became
evident that religion just wasn't going away; critiques of secularization
445. Buckser, supra note 416, at 206-07.
446. Id. But see William H. Swatos, Jr. & Kevin J. Christiano, Secularization Theory: The Course
ofa Concept, 60 Soc. RELIGION 209, 209-10 (1999) (suggesting the term was coined by Max Weber).
447. PAUL CLITEUR, THE SECULAR OUTLOOK: IN DEFENSE OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
SECULARISM 1-2 (2010); STEVE BRUCE, SECULARIZATION 1 (2011) ("The secularization paradigm
aims to explain one of the greatest changes in social structure and culture: the displacement of religion
from the centre of human life."); Swatos & Christiano, supra note 446, at 214 ("The principle thrust in
secularization theory has [been] ... that, in the face of scientific rationality, religion's influence on all
aspects of life-from personal habits to social institutions-is in dramatic decline."). The
secularization debate, as a (postulated) sociological phenomenon is distinct from secularism as a
normative value in ethics, politics, morals, etc. See CLITEUR, supra, at 3.
448. CLITEUR, supra note 447, at 3 (quoting Daniel Philpott, The Challenge of September I Ito
Secularism in International Relations, 55 WORLD POL. 66, 69 (2002)); Gorski & Altmordu, supra note
444, at 56 ("[M]ost would have agreed with the general thrust of the argument: that modernity was
somehow undermining the social significance of religion.") (internal citation omitted); Evans, supra
note 397, at I ("It was not so long ago that confident predictions were being made about the eventual
demise of religion. Religious people complained that liberal states had privitised religion; excluding it
from the public square until such time as developments in science, education and philosophy rendered
religion entirely obsolete.").
449. CLITEUR, supra note 447, at 1.
450. See generally Hadden, supra note 444.
451. Buckser, supra note 416, at 207; Gorski & Altnordu, supra note 444, at 56 (Influential
events include "[t]he rise of the Moral Majority, the Iranian Revolution, the collapse of communism
qua secular religion, the rapid spread of Pentecostalism in the global South, communal violence in
South Asia. These and other developments challenged the confident pronouncements of religious
decline that humanists, rationalists, and social scientists had been repeating since the days of Hume,
Voltaire, and Comte, to name only the best known.") (internal citations omitted).
452. Schultz, supra note 442, at 170. See also Mark Chaves, Intraorganizational Power and
Internal Secularization in Protestant Denominations, 99 AM. J. Soc. 1, 2 (1993) ("[N]ew religious
movements continue to arise; older movements like Pentecostalism and Mormonism are expanding;
and, at least in the United States, huge segments of the population continue to say that they believe in
God and continue to participate in orthodox organized religion.").
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"The central claim of the critique is that, if secularization is defined as
the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modem societies, the
theory of secularization is bunk."454 "Not only has religion persisted (and
the evidence is incontrovertible) but the theory also implies that the past
was more religious than today, which, it turns out, is not so easy to
prove."455
Some scholars have attempted "to salvage the idea behind the theory but
to soften its predictive capacity, or to shift the definition of secularization
by emphasizing different aspects of what secularization means."4 56 Mark
Chaves, for example, has suggested that secularization most appropriately
refers to a decline in religious authority, apart from individual belief.457
Charles Taylor sees a change in the conditions of belief; that is,
secularization concerns a change in what it means to believe and to be a
believer.45 8 Alexandra Walsham discards the term entirely in favor of
"desacralization" when discussing the decline in belief in divine
immanence.459
The process of secularization, therefore, has a multiplicity of
understandings, including at a minimum the pre-modern transfer of
property; the classical understanding of decline in religiosity, belief, or
observance; the decline of religious authority, per Chaves; the change in
the significance of religious observance, per Taylor; and the
desacralization or disenchantment, per Walsham. These are certainly not
the only ways secularization could be understood.460
453. Schultz, supra note 442, at 174.
454. Id.
455. Id.; Mark Chaves, Secularization as Declining Religious Authority, 72 Soc. FORCES 749,
753 (1994) ("[1]t is no longer possible to truthfully assert that 'modernity' is incompatible with
religious belief."); Chaves, supra note 452, at 2 ("'[C]lassical' secularization theory ... is no longer
tenable."); Buckser, supra note 416, at 208 (Some of the problems of applying secularization theory to
the Jewish experience stem from "the largely Christian orientation of secularization theory, which has
generally followed the Protestant tradition of privileging belief over other modes of religious
engagement.").
456. Schultz, supra note 442, at 175; Buckser, supra note 416, at 207 ("Critiques of secularization
began to emerge, and in response a number of sociologists developed more precise and sophisticated
models of the process."). For a thorough discussion of the current sociological approaches to
secularization, see Gorski & Altmordu, supra note 444, at 58-62.
457. Chaves, supra note 455, at 754-56; Chaves, supra note 452, at 7-8.
458. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 3 (2007).
459. Alexandra Walsham, The Reformation and 'The Disenchantment of the World' Reassessed,
51 HIST. J. 497, 504 (2008). Walsham contrasts "desacralization" as concerned "with the decline of
belief in divine immanence" with "secularization," which she describes as "the rejection or
marginalization of religion per se." Id.
460. See generally Olivier Tschannen, The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization, 30 J. SCt.
STUD. RELIGION 395 (1991) (discussing theoretical diversity of approaches to studying secularization
from the sociological perspective).
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B. Disassociation as Secularization
Here I suggest that one form of secularization may be seen where
(originally) religious concepts are stripped of their religious character. The
concept becomes disassociated with religion and assumes a cloak of
neutrality, possibly even approaching objective detachment. A general
example of this phenomenon can be seen in what N.J. Demerath III has
called the "paradoxical decline of liberal Protestantism."
Demerath notes that "the decline of liberal Protestantism seems
paradoxical. It can be construed as evidence both for and against the once-
reigning model of long-term 'secularization. '461 "Insofar as any churches
are waning, this would seem ipso facto evidence of secularization."4 62
"However, because some liberal churches have suffered more than many
conservative groups, it is conceivable that just the opposite trend is at
work." 463
Demerath suggests that "[t]he decline of liberal Protestantism may
actually stem from its success", 46 and that "liberal Protestants have lost
structurally at the micro level precisely because they have won culturally
at the macro level."465 In other words, the decline of liberal Protestantism
"may be the painful structural consequence of Protestantism's wider
cultural triumph." 466 A church that promotes individualism, freedom,
pluralism, and tolerance does so at its own organizational peril because
holding these values may "reduce any organization's compelling claims
by making its virtues relative." 4 67 Similarly, promoting democracy
"attenuates power" and promoting intellectual inquiry may be "corrosive
for keeping the faith," particularly propositional faith.468 In its drive to
emancipate the world, mainline liberal Protestantism may have
"emancipated its own membership." 4 69 Liberal Protestantism's cultural
victory put itself out of business. In fact, De Roover sees this
secularization-as-universalization as typical of Christianity more
generally. 470
The same sort of phenomenon may be at work in how religion has come
461. N.J. Demerath III, Cultural Victory and Organizational Defeat in the Paradoxical Decline of
Liberal Protestantism, 34 J. Scl STUDY RELIGION 458, 458 (1995).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 458-59.
464. Id. at 459-60.
465. Id. at 463.
466. Id at 460.
467. Id at 461.
468. Id
469. Id. at 462.
470. See de Roover, supra note 440, at 51 ("Christian religion ... expands ... through a moment
of secularization, whereby it achieves universalization in fact by progressively losing its specific
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to be seen as an a-religious category. As nonreligious bodies adopted
Liberal Protestant values, the religious roots of concepts like "human
rights" faded from memory.471 Here, the success of Christianity and the
domination of European states universalized the understanding of religion
as belief to such an extent that its religious origins have been largely
forgotten. Secularization as "de-religifying," rather than merely
desacralization, may be a useful line of further inquiry because, as I have
suggested in this Article and elsewhere,472 misunderstanding and
inequalities persist precisely because of ignorance of the religious roots of
common concepts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Margaret Davies has explained that
[a]t a subtle and therefore insidious level . . . , the situatedness of
law within a cultural context and history means that certain
principles based on religion rather than reason or practicality are
embedded in law: these can be difficult to remove or challenge,
even when there is very good reason to do so.473
Here, I have tried to show that one principle based on religion (here,
Christianity) is the very notion of religion itself. I have also tried to lay out
some of the reasons why even a non-Christian state such as Israel might
encounter significant difficulties in defining religion, itself a Christian
concept, on anything other than Christian terms, and suggest how such an
understanding might come to be assumed by courts to be neutral,
objective, and secular.
"The concept of religion has never been uncontentious."474 In the trio of
cases addressing who is a Jew, many Justices have explicitly assumed that
Judaism (or, at least, the status of being a Jew) is a "religion" in the same
sense that Christianity is a religion; that is, by defining membership
largely, if not exclusively, on the content of beliefs, 475 and assuming that
religion and nationality are separable. 47 6 Daphne Barak-Erez suggests that
there was "an expectation that Israel's character as the state of the Jewish
people would be reflected in its legal system and its public sphere."4 77
471. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS
SEEN 4-20 (1998).
472. See generally Petty, supra note 6.
473. Davies, supra note t, at 79. See also Marc Galanter, Secularism East and West, in
SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 234, 254 (Rhajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) ("[T]here may be 'predominant
religious aspects' in situations in which the actors are mainly unaware of them.").
474. Woodhead, supra note 389, at 121.
475. See Rufeisen, supra note 196, at 20-22 (opinion of Landau, J.); id. At 24, 31-32 (opinion of
Berinson, J.); Beresford, supra note 340, at 56 (opinion of Barak, J.).
476. See supra notes 277, 287-88, 295, 300, and accompanying text (discussing Shalit).
477. BARAK-EREZ, supra note 2, at 34.
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With respect to how the state understands religion, the Supreme Court of
Israel has left that expectation largely unfulfilled.
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